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TURNING STONES OF HOPE INTO BOULDERS
OF RESISTANCE: THE FIRST AND LAST TASK
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE CURRICULUM,
SCHOLARSHIP, AND PRACTICE*
DEREK W. BLACK**
The most important and intangible aspect of teaching and
practicing social justice law is retaining the hope that our efforts
can translate into progressive results. At times, professors'
approaches to the subject of social justice tend toward pessimism
that can have unintended negative effects on students. Thus, this
Article calls on social justice professors to explicitly teach hope
and, moreover, to produce practical scholarship on pressing legal
issues that will help students keep hope once they leave school.
This Article begins by exploring the theme of hope in John 0.
Calmore's scholarship and how it interrelates with his project of
producing social justice lawyers. It then delves into his teaching
methodology and describes the specific competencies he tried to
create in his social justice students, particularly in their writing
and their approach to building relationships with clients. Next,
the Article addresses how those lessons carry beyond law school,
including both those instances where they help and those
instances where practitioners are left wanting and needing more.
From that point, the Article proceeds to describe how our
teaching and scholarship can meet that need, and ultimately
inspire hope. The Article ends with concrete examples from the
legacy of Brown v. Board of Education that show how we can
find, teach, and keep hope.
* Copyright © 2008 by Derek W. Black.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I would like to
thank Howard University School of Law for its support, particularly Dean Kurt L.
Schmoke for a research stipend and research assistant, and Marissa Gunn, who helped me
complete this piece sooner rather than later. Foremost, I would like to thank Professor
John 0. Calmore. He has made this piece possible in more ways than are appropriate to
mention here. I would, however, like to thank him for starting me on the road of social
justice lawyering before I knew what the phrase meant and then holding my hand, so to
speak, along the way. To the extent I have achieved any success as a social justice lawyer
or professor, much of it has grown from the insights and skills I took from his courses.
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"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the
age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of
belief, it was the epoch of incredulity ... it was the spring of
hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us,
we had nothing before us."1
INTRODUCTION
The inspirational seed that sparked this piece and my most vivid
memory of John Calmore comes from his recurring attestation of his
conviction that some day hope and history will rhyme.2 He draws the
thought from a quote in Seamus Heaney's The Cure at Troy,3 but
when he utters or writes it, I am never left with the impression that he
is simply recounting someone else's faith.4 The first time I heard him
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 7 (Toby Press 2003) (1859).
2. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Remarks at UNC Conference: Reconciling Hope and
History: The Question of Reparations (Feb. 16, 2002).
3. SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CURE AT TROY: A VERSION OF SOPHOCLES'
PHILOCTETES (1991).
4. John 0. Calmore, Airing Dirty Laundry: Disputes Among Privileged Blacks-
From Clarence Thomas to "The Law School Five," 46 How. L.J. 175, 224 (2003) ("I have
often included in my public talks a quoted passage from Seamus Heaney's The Cure of
Troy [sic]: 'History says, Don't hope/On this side of the grave/But then, once in a
lifetime/The longed for tidal wave/of justice can rise up/and hope and history rhyme.' For
many people in our country, Justice Thomas represents the command of history not to
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reference this thought, his tone of voice and gracefully transparent
expressions bore witness that the hope that resided in him was special
and that the "tidal wave of justice" would in fact some day "rise up"
to meet him.
What was far less clear, however, was from whence and for how
long that hope had sprung. Such a strong and abiding hope is
remarkable in contrast to the colleagues, students, and communities
about whom he writes and who are so frequently disposed of hope.'
In fact, Calmore is particularly attuned to the bleakness that grabs
others and surrounds him. For instance, he developed a course called
Social Justice Lawyering in which he integrates issues of racial
injustice with various other forms of discrimination, inequity, and
disadvantage, and explores the lawyering obstacles that are common
to all of them.6 At the outset, he warns his students that his course
"will focus on some harsh realities of oppression, subordination,
injustice, and inequalities in the law and that this could ... depress
and enervate students."7 Although he asserts these realities "need
hope on this side of the grave. If for no other reason, I could not delight in his visit to our
law school. I could not share in his dream and vision of America. I need a dream and
vision with a deeper, more connected human touch, so I am working for a better
reconciliation of hope and history. In short, I want to live out a better rhyme.").
5. See, e.g., DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 184 (1993) (identifying a
hopelessness among isolated inner-city communities); John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context:
The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and
Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1938 (1999) [hereinafter Calmore, Call to Context]
(discussing clients who experienced a world that was without options); John 0. Calmore,
"Chasing the Wind": Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-education, and
Engaging in Professional Re-socialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2004)
[hereinafter Calmore, Chasing the Wind] (observing a lot of frustration among critical,
progressive scholars and those with whom they collaborate). One of my students wrote in
a reflection piece, with much dismay, that she did "not believe social justice is feasible in
this country as long as capitalism remains intact." Journal Entry, Social Justice Lawyering
Student, Howard University School of Law, at *1 (Aug. 28, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with North Carolina Law Review).
6. The introduction to the textbook for the course indicates that social justice means
"'eliminati[ng] ... institutionalized discrimination,' " [piromoting individual and
collective well-being, enhancing human dignity, and correcting imbalances of power and
wealth." MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN 0. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 1 (2003) (quoting ROBERT
D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 3
(1994)). "Social justice lawyering seeks to give material meaning to these ideals in the
daily lives of individuals and communities that are marginalized, subordinated, and
underrepresented." Id.
7. John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind: Pedagogical Reflections
and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 912 (1997) [hereinafter Calmore, Close
Encounters].
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not" depress students,8 as students come to more fully understand the
complexity and depth of oppression in our society, some still wonder
how they could do anything other than despair. Many of Calmore's
colleagues may reflect similar sentiments.9 Without fail, however, he
implores us to find hope and keep it. Unfortunately, we have no
roadmap as to how to do so. In some respects, hope may be just
natural to him, but for those with shallower wells of faith upon which
to draw, a roadmap would certainly be of benefit.
My task in this piece then is to capture the nature of Calmore's
hope and explore how it has animated his teaching, scholarship,
advocacy, and intellectual evolution. Likewise, I will examine his
hope in context and examine how it reverberates through those he
has most directly touched: his students, colleagues, and those
institutions with which he has been affiliated. In doing so, we will find
that his hope has found wings and managed to rhyme with history in
more ways than even he might have supposed. Because of his
dedication to hope, future social justice lawyers are leaving law school
far more prepared and sophisticated. They are engaging client
communities with a new humility and a profound respect that
prompts these lawyers to respond to, rather than direct, the
community. Yet, as an academy, we must still do more to prepare
students.
For some students, telling them that they need not despair is
equivalent to telling a cancer patient that he need not worry about his
illness. Even placing the problems of social justice practice aside, law
students are one of the most unhappy and stressed groups of
individuals imaginable. By their third year of law school, a full forty
percent of law students are depressed."0 I would like to think that our
social justice students become less susceptible to unhappiness and
depression by pursuing careers in which they find meaning. Yet, I
fear that we, as social justice-oriented professors, might just as easily
be inadvertently fostering other counterproductive emotions or
steering them away from social justice careers, as we tend to spend so
8. Id.
9. For instance, the opening sentence of Derrick Bell's casebook on race and the law
states that "[r]acism remains a permanent facet of American civilization." DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (5th ed. 2004).
10. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 875 (1999); see also
Pamela Daley & Arla Lisa McMillan, Is There Life After (and During) Law School?, 94
ILL. B.J. 256, 256 (2006) (noting the opinion of psychotherapists that "too many law
students and lawyers are depressed and discontented and that law schools do too little to
help them cope with the demands of legal education and practice").
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much of our scholarship and teaching describing society and the law's
illnesses. A select group devotes at least some time toward practical
cures for those ills," but even fewer devote substantive efforts toward
affirming students' belief that those cures are possible.
Given the practice they will soon face, our social justice students
need more from their professors than sophisticated analysis; they
need inspiration. While ready and able to deliver the analysis, we are
less attuned to the need-or less confident in our ability-to deliver
the inspiration. Moreover, it can be difficult to prevent our critical
evaluation from spilling over into a seeming negativity that can
undermine our purposes. More so than in other courses, social justice
professors must be cognizant of both the spoken and unspoken
messages they send their students, and hope must be explicitly
included in those messages. If our students leave with nothing else,
they must leave with hope. Without it, they will not leave law school
moving in the direction that we intend for them.
To further the lesson of hope in our teaching and scholarship, I
begin Part I of this piece by identifying the theme of hope in
Calmore's scholarship and how it interrelates with his project of
producing social justice lawyers. I delve into his teaching
methodology and describe the specific competencies he tried to create
in his social justice students, particularly in their writing and their
approach to building relationships with clients. In Part II, relying on
personal experience, I address how those lessons carry beyond law
school, including both those instances where they help and those
instances where practitioners are left wanting more. I challenge us to
do more through our scholarship to assist students and practitioners.
In addition to identifying injustice, we must assist our students in
formulating new and compelling legal claims for justice. By doing so,
we can not only inspire hope, we can deliver it. In Part III, I
demonstrate how we can explicitly teach hope and help students
identify it in the most difficult of circumstances. I briefly explore an
often overlooked legacy of Brown v. Board of Education2 that
portends hope. Although Brown's legacy has not been a story of fully
integrated schools, and schools are actually resegregating, 3 Brown
11. Professor Harold McDougall, in particular, builds his course in Civil Rights
Planning around problem identification and problem solving. Harold A. McDougall, For
Critical Race Practitioners: Race, Racism and American Law (4th ed.) by Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., 46 HOw. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2002) (book review).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING's DREAM OR
PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? app. (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/reseg04/brown50.pdf.
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taught our society some valuable lessons that continue to reverberate.
Fifty years after Brown, its lessons are prompting schools to fight for,
rather than against, integration.14 Brown's lessons are similarly
prompting many states to afford a higher, rather than minimal, level
of education.15 By articulating such stories with the appropriate
perspective, social justice-oriented professors can create an
equilibrium between the harsh realities of injustice and the slow, yet
attainable, substantiation of justice. We can, likewise, reinforce those
emotions that brought many justice-oriented students to law school in
the first instance.
I. PREPARING SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERS: JOHN CALMORE'S LIFE'S
LABOR
A. A Scholarship of Hope
The impulse to begin preparing and expanding the ranks of social
justice lawyers can only come from the belief that the world suffers
from injustice. Recognizing injustice is not in itself a remarkable or
unusual sentiment, but a more profound root of the impulse to
expand the ranks of social justice lawyers is the firm conviction that
lawyers can and must make a difference in the way our society
operates. Some attorneys enter "public interest" jobs with no intent
to fundamentally alter structures or policies, but merely to provide a
public service and technical skill, or to mitigate inevitable suffering
that, from their perspective, is not necessarily unjust.16 Thus, these
attorneys need not effect change to find or make their efforts
meaningful. In contrast, social justice lawyers' fundamental purpose
is to effect substantive and lasting change.17 Such an ambitious
14. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 240-86 and accompanying text.
16. AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (1998) (distinguishing cause
lawyering from the mere provision of technical skills to clients). Calmore distinguishes
public interest lawyering from social justice lawyering, finding the former has become too
inclusive and now even includes reactionary elements that are hostile to social justice.
Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1169-70; see also Lisa Anderson, Falwell Saw
Law School as Tool To Alter Society, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 2007, § 1, at 1 (reporting on the
recent phenomenon of religiously conservative law schools whose purpose is to change
society and confront secular culture on issues of abortion and same-sex marriage).
17. See, e.g., Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1171 (articulating "social
justice lawyering as a movement that can reverse the phenomenon of preservation-
through-transformation by engaging in 'third-dimension lawyering' and by filing 'thick
complaints' in federal court"); John 0. Calmore, The Law and Culture-Shift: Race and the
Warren Court Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2002) [hereinafter Calmore,
Warren Court Legacy] (pointing to the need for "continuous enforcement of the change").
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purpose is imbued with a vision of the future that is different than the
current circumstances and an abiding hope that someday their vision
of the future will come to fruition." It is that very hope from which
John Calmore's scholarship, teaching, and perseverance comes. Even
before he formalized a course in social justice lawyering, his
scholarship began building a basis for it. Although not as explicit as
other lessons, the first and hardest lesson of social justice lawyering
that Calmore ever taught was a subtle one of hope.
From his earliest oppositional work to his later more aspirational
work, the most consistent theme that rings through Calmore's
scholarship is hope. For instance, in one of his early seminal pieces
on critical race theory, he challenges "the universality of white
experience/judgment as the authoritative standard that binds people
of color and normatively measures, directs, controls, and regulates the
terms of proper thought, expression, presentment, and behavior."' 9
The challenge, however, is predominantly in principle rather than
practice, as his primary claim is merely to the right to speak as "a
matter of existential voice."2  He exhausts himself even in that,
writing that he could find "no satisfying way" to "end the article"
other than to just "stop writing."21 Yet, at the end of the article, just
as he seems to brace the reader for a concession of the inevitability of
continued racial oppression, he forces himself to find hope. He
writes:
When all is said and done, this writing is probably for my
children, 10-year-old Jonathan and 6-year-old Canai, and for
their rainbow of little friends, associates, and peers, who at this
time cannot really appreciate what I have struggled to write
here. Perhaps the slim hope, however, does indeed lie in
"cohort replacement."22
18. See generally MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 34-60
(organizing a chapter on "Envisioning Social Justice Lawyering"); William H. Simon,
Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 469 (1984) (discussing a vision
of lawyering that "appeals to an ideal of practice as an activity that constitutes and
transforms the actors and the system in which they act and that thus implies ... political
commitment").
19. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160
(1992) [hereinafter Calmore, Critical Race].
20. Id. at 2171.
21. Id. at 2229.
22. Id. (quoting Glen Firebaugh & Kenneth E. Davis, Trends in Antiblack Prejudice,
1972-1984: Region and Cohort Effects, 94 AM. J. Soc. 251, 251 (1988)). Firebaugh and
Davis define "cohort replacement" as "the replacement of older, more prejudiced birth
cohorts with younger, less prejudiced ones." Glen Firebaugh & Kenneth E. Davis, Trends
2008]
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Over time, this ever-so-small hope slowly perpetuates itself.
Calmore becomes less ambiguous, rejecting the claim that there will
never be a time when whites and blacks treat each other equally.23
His writing eventually begins to exemplify a steady and consistent
hope that refuses to concede the inevitability of the staggering
problems it addresses. At the same time, however, he intersperses his
articles with particular quotes that leave his audience to wonder
whether his hope is grounded in anything more than survivalist
necessity. Discussing the black/white racial divide, he concedes that
one has no choice other than to respond to it with opposition or
simply suffer from its debilitating effects.24 Thus, internal fortitude
and the need to persevere, rather than a realistic expectation of
progress, seem to animate his hope at times. His choice to quote
Vdclav Havel, the formerly imprisoned President of Czechoslovakia,
reinforces as much:
Either we have hope within us or we don't: it is a dimension of
the soul.... Hope in this deep and powerful sense is ... an
ability to work for something because it is good, not just
because it stands a chance to succeed.... It is also this hope,
above all, which gives us the strength to live and continually to
try things, even in conditions that seem as hopeless as ours do
here and now.2
In another article, Calmore reiterates this sentiment when he
identifies his wellspring of hope with that of Dr. Martin Luther King,
who was never an optimist, but remained hopeful simply because he
had no other choice.26
Although identifying with this perseverance through hope and
never embracing full optimism, Calmore's hope gradually diverges
from fatalism and grows much more concrete over the years. His
hope eventually asserts itself in a manner that challenges the status
in Antiblack Prejudice, 1972-1984: Region and Cohort Effects, 94 AM. J. SOC. 251, 251
(1988).
23. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 916. He does, however, acknowledge
that overcoming the black/white divide will require more effort than he currently sees
occurring. Id.
24. Id.
25. John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1273 (1995)
[hereinafter Calmore, Racialized Space] (quoting MARIAN W. EDELMAN, THE MEASURE
OF OUR SUCCESS: A LETTER TO MY CHILDREN AND YOURS 33-34 (1992)).
26. John 0. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy in the Third Dimension: Addressing the
Problem of "Preservation-Through-Transformation," 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 615, 638 (2004)
[hereinafter Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy] (referencing Cornel West's
characterization of Dr. King as a "prisoner of hope").
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quo. In 2004, he is resolute when he writes: "As a social justice
worker, I sense I am not alone and that our time is coming., 27 Then,
discussing trends in the legal academy and practice, he declares, "the
concern for social justice is real and it is growing and spreading." 28
Thus, in his "social justice lawyering" articles, he regularly implores
that we must "keep hope alive. '29 In this respect, his writing bucks
the trend of those who lose faith in the better wills of men and women
and who effectively resign themselves to the injustice they see.
He finds this hopeful and optimistic center through an increasing
focus on humanity. Rather than seeing human nature solely as a
source of conflict and injustice, he identifies it as a source of change
and possibility. All of his scholarship situates the struggle for justice
as occurring within the context of structural oppression, but his later
scholarship also incorporates the power and relevance of human
agency. For instance, Peggy McIntosh conceptualizes "whiteness" as
being an "invisible knapsack" of privileges that whites use to navigate
the world so often and easily that they do not even recognize the
privilege.3" Other scholars rely on this concept to explain domination
and oppression.31  Calmore himself relies on the concept of
"whiteness" to describe the norms by which non-whites are evaluated
and how non-whites are forced "to re-invent themselves [and]
perform within a framework of whiteness as audition. 32  But he
refuses to concede the continuation of its dominance. In fact, he
believes whites can contribute to the unraveling of white dominance
because they share in the "humanity that connects us all."33 Calling
27. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1174.
28. Id. In typical Calmore fashion, he writes of teaching the challenging seminar on
critical race theory: "I see a similar openness to critical race theory. Its percussive quality
is freedom drumming and its energy is enough for the long haul." John 0. Calmore,
Random Notes of an Integration Warrior-Part 2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic
"Truth" of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1589, 1615-16 (1999).
29. See, e.g., Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1133; Calmore, Social
Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 636.
30. Peggy McIntosh famously coined whiteness or white privilege as being "like an
invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides,
codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks." Peggy
McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming To See
Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A
CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22,23 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
31. See, e.g., john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure To Interrogate White
Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 435 (2000); Stephanie M. Wildman, Language and
Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 893 (1995).
32. John 0. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: Status
Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 103 (2005) [hereinafter Calmore,
Whiteness as Audition].
33. Id. at 128.
2008]
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on whites to incorporate, rather than merely assimilate, non-whites,
he envisions a future of national norms that are far broader than the
current single, narrow identity.34 Such norms would create space for
and include multiple identities." In short, he sets himself apart from
others, first, by finding hope in the future and, second, by looking to
the humanity in each of us to find hope.
Sentiments connecting justice with our better human senses carry
throughout Calmore's scholarship from the second half of his career.36
Faith in our humanity ultimately surfaces as the greatest hope we
might have, as humanity calls or redeems us to a more just society.
He expresses this notion most clearly in his 2002 evaluation of the
Warren Court's successes and failures.37 Introducing the subject, he
writes: "I think we are all so tired and beat down from the travail of
racism ... that most of us really yearn for comty, for the more
humane community."38  Then, for the first time in any of his
scholarship, Calmore's hope, or yearning itself, prompts him to de-
emphasize the weight of society's flaws and see promise in humanity
by suggesting that history, context, and structures may not entirely
bind us to perpetuate our past failures. He suggests we can "put
indifference and fear aside [and] ... forget all that we think we know
about each other and start over again."39 If we can do that, we can
"reimagine, reinvent, and reestablish America as a place of racial
comity."'" Sounding far from the law professor and critical scholar
and more in tune with Dr. King's exhortation that blacks should bring
whites back into the "beloved community,"'" Calmore implores us to
34. Id. at 127 ("Those of us who press for incorporation should not accept the mere
extension of dominant values and protections that may accrue to us as individualized,
integrated tokens.").
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1173, 1175, 1180 (calling on
advocates to connect with marginalized groups on a human level and predicating social
justice lawyering upon a respect for human dignity); Calmore, Close Encounters, supra
note 7, at 906-07 (using "strong democratic talk" in his classroom discussion "to forge a
viable link between human relations and social justice").
37. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17.
38. Id. at 1134.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., The Birth of a New Nation, Sermon Delivered
at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama (Apr. 7, 1957), in A CALL TO
CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 13, 32
(Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001) ("The aftermath of nonviolence is the
creation of the beloved community. The aftermath of nonviolence is redemption. The
aftermath of nonviolence is reconciliation. The aftermath of violence are emptiness and
bitterness."); Martin Luther King, Jr., Facing the Challenge of a New Age, Address
Before the First Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change, Montgomery,
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"be tolerant of one another's ignorance and awkward questions,
remain extremely patient with each other, not overstate or understate
incidents of racism, and, perhaps most of all, handle the difficult
moments with grace. 42
Reinforcing his point, he also finds that it was actually our
disconnect from the human element that caused us to lose the
momentum and promise of the civil rights movement.4 3 The Warren
Court's progressive precedents in cases such as Brown, Loving v.
Virginia," and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,a" provided the hope for
significant social change until later decisions such as Milliken v.
Bradley,46 City of Memphis v. Greene,47 and others eroded those
precedents. Responding to that erosion, advocates devolved into a
battle over legalisms and, in the process, lost their commitment to the
humanizing aspects that brought the civil rights movement its
progress in the first instance.a
Connection to human dignity, not legal principle, provided the
synergy for progressive change during the Warren Court era.
Calmore argues that we must recapture that connection because "in
seeking a just society we must open our hearts as well as our minds."4 9
And it is here, in focusing on the humanity that still resides in us all,
Alabama (Dec. 3, 1956), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 135,140 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) ("But the end
is reconciliation; the end is redemption; the end is the creation of the beloved
community.").
42. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1136.
43. Id. at 1134 ("The true tragedy of the civil rights movement is that it was too
quickly disconnected from the humanizing aspects of the struggle that marked its origins
and animated it.... Once severed from the larger community, law was easily cabined,
justice easily delayed, and racist resistance easily enabled.").
44. 388 U.S. 1 (1966) (holding restrictions by race on the right to marry
unconstitutional).
45. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (prohibiting private discrimination in housing even though no
governmental action was involved).
46. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting a school desegregation plan to an intradistrict
remedy absent proof of intentional interdistrict segregation). Consequently, this decision
eliminated the possibility of effective integration in Detroit and school districts similar to
it.
47. 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (permitting a street closing that eliminated traffic to and from
a black neighborhood through a white one).
48. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1134. Calmore critiques
Memphis, not necessarily for its legal analysis, but for its dehumanization of blacks in a
way that permitted the Court to characterize blacks as unwanted traffic and to perpetuate
the indignity upon blacks that tells them they simply are not welcome in the white
neighborhood. Id. at 1112-20. Although the Court in Memphis overturned no important
legal principles, in this dehumanizing respect it returned to a sensibility that existed prior
to Brown.
49. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 905.
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that Calmore finds hope. That hope eventually breeds and is
incorporated into his push for a new social justice lawyering
movement.
B. A New Curriculum
Calmore's growing hope and faith in humanity coincided with a
subtle shift in the subject matter of his scholarship and teaching. His
work in the second half of his professorial career came to reflect a
more practical purpose. Unlike others, his scholarship became less of
a discussion with his colleagues and more of a source of inspiration
and guidance for his students. In particular, his course and textbook
in social justice lawyering exemplify a larger concern with students
and practice than theory. 0
Although the phrase "social justice" may be common parlance
now, when Calmore was shifting his scholarship and teaching in this
direction, it was more enigmatic. In fact, I often struggled to
succinctly explain to fellow students-and even now colleagues-
what a course in social justice lawyering "is." My simple answer is
that the course is professional responsibility for social justice
attorneys. As designed by its authors, it does not purport to teach any
doctrine, reveal any grand theories, or even focus on any particular
area of the law. Instead, it alerts social justice students to the world
they will soon inhabit, including the struggles they will face and the
ineptitudes they may carry with them if they are not attuned to the
unique and multifaceted role of a social justice attorney.51
Calmore himself sees the course as radically different from
traditional legal education. Traditional legal education presents itself
as a neutral process that merely teaches students the analyses, rules,
and procedures with which society governs itself, but Calmore rejects
the notion that any education, much less law school, is neutral.52 In
fact, legal education may be one of the least neutral educational
50. See, e.g., MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 7 ("Encouraging
reflection and reevaluation of values and roles, this text examines issues of professional
responsibility in many selected social justice contexts that face lawyers and law students.").
51. In those respects, the course prepared me more for the practice of social justice
law than any other single course in law school.
52. See Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 908 (noting that Calmore follows
a pedagogy that "assumes that the educational process is neither neutral nor conflict-
free"). Some argue that Calmore's and others' theory of education takes a nihilist
approach toward law by emphasizing that the law is value laden and nonneutral. Id. at
908-09 (citing comments by Dean Paul Carrington). Calmore rebuts these charges by
asserting that his theory of education does not teach that legal principle is irrelevant, but
rather that students can "resolve conflicts between personal values and [the] professional
role" as attorneys only when they understand that law is not value free. Id. at 909.
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processes through which students go. Calmore concurs with Duncan
Kennedy's characterization of legal education as "training for
hierarchy," meaning that law students acquiesce in and learn to
reproduce the systems that stratify opportunities and resources."
In contrast, Calmore's social justice lawyering course directly
challenges the biases in legal education, warning of legal education's
potential to mask bias for neutrality and to present this neutrality as a
normative means to achieve justice. Calmore further argues that
social justice lawyering should not stand alone in exposing bias;
rather, all professors should address the law's and legal education's
biases in their courses.54 Eventually, using his scholarship and
teaching to offer students this type of counter-hegemonic education
became Calmore's primary goal: "I am hopeful [my few students] will
learn and spread what Charles Lawrence calls 'the Word.' I am
hopeful that the handful has been given inspiration and direction ...
toward a more just society. This is why I teach and learn."55
Because of its enigmatic nature, however, teaching social justice
lawyering carries with it an unusually heavy burden. In fact, Calmore
operates from the premise that most students need to be re-
socialized.56 Although students may enter law school with personal
values that are consistent with social justice, legal education instills a
different set of professional values and norms that often act to
reinforce inequity and the status quo. 7 Unfortunately, students
uncritically adopt these new values and norms.5 In this respect,
Calmore concludes that "[t]raditional law study, both in terms of
course offerings and teaching methodology, may detract from
learning the lessons of social justice."59  The "better" a student
becomes at the study of law, the more difficult pursuing social justice
may become. In fact, the "most fully socialized individuals, those who
uncritically accept their professional roles ... tend to be the highest
53. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1205 (citing DUNCAN KENNEDY,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST
THE SYSTEM, at i-ii (1983)).
54. Id. at 1205.
55. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 926 (footnote omitted).
56. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1177 ("[D]eveloping a commitment
to social justice requires a re-socialization.").
57. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM, at i-ii (1983) (describing legal
education as training for hierarchy). Relying on Duncan Kennedy's characterization of
legal education as training for hierarchy, Calmore posits social justice lawyering as the
antithesis. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1205-06.
58. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 925.
59. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1177.
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achieving students."'  Ultimately, law school compels students to
embrace the notion that lawyers are simply amoral agents that
operate within these structures, regardless of whether these structures
61are oppressive.
In response, social justice lawyering must push students "to
question, if not challenge, the dominant understandings that drive
their professional socialization., 62 Students can then gain the ability
to "reject the option of conforming to the 'logic of the present system'
and, instead, 'deal critically and creatively' in helping to advance the
concerns of social justice."63  Once students recognize the system's
biases, they feel free to counter them with their own personal values.
By integrating their values into their concept of lawyering, they can
create a holistic, rather than fractured, identity. 6 These students no
longer find the notion of attorneys as "amoral technicians,"'65 who
represent causes at odds with their own, as an appealing prospect.
However, without re-socialization, many students will later face rude
awakenings in practice when their naivet6 finally fades and they are
asked to bring their skills to bear on the lives of others.66
Once students' approach to the law and legal profession changes,
they see the law's "underlying assumptions and unspoken norms" as
targets at which to lodge justice claims, rather than neutral concepts
that require their acquiescence. 67 The law is revealed as a tool that
can either inflict or remedy injustice.68 Too often it does the former,69
and a social justice attorney's job is to use it for the latter. By
illuminating the injustice in those underlying assumptions and norms,
social justice lawyering urges students to adopt a position of
60. Id. at 1183.
61. See id. at 1182 (noting that "[i]t is convenient for ... law students to inhabit a
simplified moral world that cultivates professionals who are at best amoral technicians").
62. Id. at 1177.
63. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 908 (quoting Richard Shaull,
Introduction to PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 15 (1992)).
64. ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMELSTEIN & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A
LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONALISM 1-3 (1981), reprinted in MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra
note 6, at 209-11.
65. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1182.
66. Id. at 1183 ("Those most rudely awakened after law school are those who were
fully socialized while attending law school.").
67. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 912 (quoting POWER, PRIVILEGE
AND LAW, supra note 30, at 616).
68. Id. at 910 (citing POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 30, at 11).
69. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-09 (1986) (arguing




opposition and engage in efforts to disrupt patterns of unequal power
and domination.7 ° In short, social justice lawyering students learn to
unmask the law's values, assess the consistency of those values with
their personal visions of justice, and then challenge, where
appropriate, the adoption of the law's values as normative.
C. The Bridge from Real Communities to Their Future Advocates
Re-socializing students and broadening their perspectives alone
will not fully prepare them for the real work of social justice. One can
easily be Pollyannaish and simply misunderstand the practical aspects
of social justice lawyering. The picture of Thurgood Marshall, James
Nabrit Jr., and George Hayes smiling on the steps of the Supreme
Court when it decided Brown is so familiar and symbolic that it can
be misleading. It is not balanced by a picture of Oliver Hill Sr.'s
modest meetings in South Carolina's un-air conditioned, packed
churches late in the evenings or with stories of his running from one
single-room plank home to another, trying to sign up clients.71 In fact,
visual documentation of most social justice lawyering is unavailable
because the cameras some might imagine hoarding around the
attorneys simply are not there.72 Likewise, prototypical clients like
Rosa Parks are few and far between.73 The communities in which
social justice lawyers will work are populated by individuals who are
just as reluctant to speak to a lawyer-social justice or not-as they
are to speak with the numerous other outsiders who inevitably end up
making decisions about community members' lives, often
compounding the oppression they already experience.
Calmore's work attempts to impress upon students that social
justice lawyering is not a theoretical or legally intuitive exercise, nor is
it glamorous. Rather, the work is grounded in communities that are
largely foreign to attorneys, but into which attorneys must immerse
themselves to gain understanding, competency, and the community's
70. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 912.
71. For a recounting of Oliver Hill's exploits in Brown, see OLIVER W. HILL, THE
BIG BANG: BROWN VS BOARD OF EDUCATION, AND BEYOND: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF OLIVER W. HILL, SR. 148-88 (Jonathan K. Stubbs ed., 2000).
72. The absence of such pictures in Oliver Hill's autobiography is telling enough. The
only community-oriented picture in his autobiography during the period leading up to and
immediately following Brown is one from his election headquarters in 1948, on the night
he won a seat on the Richmond City Council. Id. at 227.
73. During a time of violence and de jure segregation, many were simply wary to
stand up. Rosa Parks's stance against injustice was not happenstance, but rather a result
of participation in prior training and organizing. See Highlander Research and Education
Center, A Tribute to Rosa Parks, http://www.highlandercenter.org/n-rosa-parks.asp (last
visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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trust. In one article, Calmore uses his own example of past naivet6 to
serve as a wake-up call to students and colleagues. He admits to
previously believing in the "Horatio Alger Myth"74 and failing to see
the level of oppression the inner-city poor experience.75 Although no
text can deliver or substitute for experiential lessons,76 Calmore's
social justice lawyering textbook alerts individuals to their own
shortcomings and highlights those issues to which they should be
attuned.77
One of the first tasks is to help students understand who their
most marginalized clients are, which includes understanding clients in
context beyond what their legal claims might look like. Throughout
his work, Calmore issues what he refers to as a "call to context" that
directs our attention to the inner-city poor,78 who "are nakedly
oppressed [and] at risk of living out their lives as 'static, limited, and
expendable.' "" The lives of the inner-city poor are inapposite to the
Horatio Alger Myth and the ethos of individualism and opportunity.
"[T]hey experience poverty not simply as individuals, but as members
74. Horatio Alger wrote numerous stories about characters who, through hard work,
elevated themselves from poverty. The characterization of these stories as myth is meant
to challenge the notion that the American Dream, or at least a middle-class lifestyle, is
available to all who put in the effort. See generally CAROL NACKENOFF, THE FICTIONAL
REPUBLIC: HORATIO ALGER AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1994).
75. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1943.
76. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1169. Calmore writes:
I think that students who aspire to engage in social justice advocacy cannot learn
all they need to know within the classroom, because "[s]ocial justice lawyering
envisions the practice of law both on behalf of and alongside of subordinated
peoples, with the efforts and achievements of members of the community [as] a
crucial aspect of the work."
Id. (quoting MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 5). My social justice
lawyering students' reflection pieces have revealed the same. One student admitted that
after reading the materials for the first part of the class she thought she "got it" and that
the readings became redundant. Journal Entry, Social Justice Lawyering Student, Howard
University School of Law, at *1 (Nov. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). However, she wrote that she only later became disabused
of this notion when I assigned the class to work on a pro bono project. Id. When she was
forced to confront real clients, she finally realized the importance of the nuances we had
covered regarding client-centered advocacy versus traditional advocacy. Id.
77. The textbook addresses several complex issues, including the ideals that students
hold about the practice of law and justice, the obstacles that will confront them in practice,
the difficulty for the oppressed to obtain counsel, the unique attorney-client relationship
that social justice lawyers maintain, the communal context in which they will work, the
ability to identify injustice, and professional responsibility challenges. See generally
MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6.
78. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1927.
79. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1176 (quoting IRA GOLDENBERG,
OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL INTERVENTION 2 (1978)).
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of a poor community."'8 In some respects, the communities in which
today's poor live are also dissimilar from those of past generations.
Past generations suffered poverty as a result of deprivation, lost
opportunity, and exploitation, but they experienced oppression within
the national economic and social system. 81 Insofar as their experience
occurred within this system, they had at least some potential for
escaping poverty and climbing into a higher rung of society.
Conversely, today's inner-city poor do not experience inequality
within the national economic system; rather, they are entirely
removed from it and are treated as simply superfluous to economic
and societal organization.82
In addition, the intersection of race and geography with poverty
exacerbates the inner-city poor's economic oppression. First, the
forces of suburbanization geographically isolate them from
opportunities, resources, and infrastructures.83  Moreover, as
members of racial minority groups, they are citizens from whom
members of larger society have traditionally intentionally distanced
themselves spatially. After distancing themselves, those members of
larger society can more easily conceptualize inequality as the minority
group's own problem and one that broader society need not address.84
Calmore argues that this has led toward political systems seeing the
inner-city poor themselves as being the problem, rather than the
societal forces that operate upon them and cause inequality.
Current discourse attempts to obscure these underlying currents,
but Calmore argues they still shape practice and policy. The label
"underclass," for instance, is more than just a reference to the inner-
city poor, but rather a judgment that the inner-city poor lead lives
contrary to society's "norms of behavior."86 Thus, they, rather than
society, must change.87  Calmore, however, finds the label
"underclass" is an anesthetized way of referencing that they deserve
80. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1943.
81. Id. at 1943-46 (discussing what Michael Harrington calls "new poverty" (citing
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 9 (1984))).
82. Id. at 1943.
83. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5 (discussing the law of opportunity
and resources in inner-city minority communities); Raymond A. Mohl, Planned
Destruction: The Interstates and Central Housing, in MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN,
supra note 6, at 859 (detailing how the interstate system destroyed many African
American neighborhoods and allowed whites to flee to the suburbs).
84. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5, at 84-93 (describing geographic isolation
between blacks and whites).
85. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1244-45.
86. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1951.
87. Id.
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to be poor and are unworthy of our help.88 In essence, the term
represents a covert form of racial prejudice.89 This anesthetized
perspective, nevertheless, is a basis upon which society justifies
abandoning any commitment to assisting these communities.9"
Calmore does not take for granted that students and lawyers are
also susceptible to these messages and might inadvertently act in
counterproductive ways toward the poor. He attempts to lay a
foundation for substantive bridges between lawyers and the inner-city
poor and avoid the traditional practices of lawyers who at times have
swept into the communities as invaders only to later leave as quickly
as they arrived.9' In this respect, his work again relies heavily on a
faith in humanity.92 When stripped to its core, Calmore's belief that
lawyers can act contrary to their training and privilege is founded on
the humanity that lawyers and community members share. Speaking
of the struggles his students will face in practice, he writes that "the
most basic theme deals with their social distance from marginalized,
subordinated, and underrepresented clients and communities."93
Only by relying on their common humanity can they come together.94
He does not suggest that lawyers can approach their
representation of the inner-city poor in a humanistic vacuum that
ignores or attempts to "separate [the inner-city poor] from their
racial, geographical, and class identities."95 But providing effective
legal representation for those affected by systemic oppression
requires approaching clients on the level of humanity because it may
be one of the few means through which lawyers and clients can find
commonality. Calmore pushes future and current lawyers toward this
commonality by demanding that they engage clients as equals and co-
88. Id. at 1952 (citing HERBERT GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE
UNDERCLASS AND ANTI-POVERTY POLICY 59 (1995)).
89. Id. at 1952 (noting that "because the term underclass is racialized, it is a
convenient way for masking anti-black or anti-Latino sentiments").
90. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1245. Integration is purportedly the
only option that can change their situation. Id. at 1246.
91. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1950 (specifically distinguishing
attorneys who live "outside of the intersection of race, space, and poverty" from the
clients who live at the intersection and emphasizing that the attorneys cannot come to
these communities "with canned claims and prayers for relief").
92. Id. at 1955 (noting that it is the "professional responsibility" of the social justice
lawyer to "respect[] the client community's voice, vision, and humanity").
93. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1204.
94. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1955 (finding it is only by "respecting
the client community's voice, vision, and humanity" that attorneys "do good").
95. Id. at 1940. The inner-city poor are not merely disadvantaged by poverty or
subject to racial bias as individual forces; they are "trapped at the intersection of race,
space, and poverty." Id. at 1931.
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collaborators." With this foundation, clients and lawyers can build
bridges between themselves that allow them to identify collective
strategies to resist oppression. Moreover, by collaborating with the
community, rather than simply executing a legal strategy, attorneys
gain a greater appreciation for the community. Attorneys can come
to understand the community's " 'marginality as a position and place
of resistance,' "I which explains "how they are not overwhelmed by
their pain and deprivation."98 Thus, the attorney can respect, rather
than pity or patronize, the client community.
Attorneys who have a learned respect for their client
communities practice law in a manner methodologically different
than traditional practice. Calmore notes a significant distinction
between "regnant" lawyering-which "tend[s] to maintain a
disassociated power over.., clients, embracing the traditional lawyer-
client paradigm" 99 -and progressive, rebellious, or social justice
lawyering-which is responsive to and respectful of the needs and
autonomy of marginalized groups."°  The latter involves
"collaborative work with the client community," "dialogue and
mutual education ... [and] strategic work,"1°  and helping
communities "learn how to interpret moments of domination as
opportunities for resistance. ' '" °" In fact, Calmore suggests that
96. See, e.g., Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1199 (urging attorneys to
engage in "collaborative work with the client community"); Calmore, Warren Court
Legacy, supra note 17, at 1100 (noting that public engagement is a vital factor if social
justice lawyering is to create social change (citing Nan Hunter, Lawyering for Social
Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1997))); Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra
note 26, at 623 (same).
97. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1950 (quoting BELL HOOKS, YEARNING:
RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 150 (1990)).
98. Id. at 1950.
99. Id. at 1933-34. Gerald Lopez first introduced the concept of regnant lawyering in
contrast to rebellious lawyering in GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 11-82 (1992). Lopez identifies the
characteristics of regnant lawyers as seeing individual "service" work and "impact" work
as dichotomous categories, litigating more than anything else, devaluing community
organizing and community input in "legal" work, resisting meaningful or substantive
connections to the institutions or groups they represent, not grasping how large societal
structures relate to the status quo, blaming the client for many of the problems clients
encounter, conceptualizing the battle as one fought by attorneys who merely need clients
to bring claims, and ignoring how formal changes will affect the lives of subordinated
people. Id. at 24.
100. See Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1934. For further sources drawing
this distinction, see MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 47; Calmore,
Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1201; and Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note
26, at 625.
101. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 623.
102. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1199.
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responsible social justice lawyering requires an attorney to relinquish
her power, leadership, and hierarchical position over clients:
[W]e cannot come into the picture with canned claims and
prayers for relief. We must be open to being used by the client
community in ways that they deem appropriate. We can
provide technical assistance and advocacy perspective; we can
enhance their stories; and we can help them leverage their
positions.... [W]e can join the political project by occupying
the real-and-imagined worlds on the margin and helping the
community to reclaim these spaces as places of radical openness
and possibility.1 3
Calmore elaborates further:
We must ... adopt a progressively activist, yet patiently open,
collaboration with the client community.... We must come
with a faith in the ability of those in these communities to hold
fast to their struggles and their potential to, with support,
transform life within these communities.... [W]e must have
faith that our client base can reconstitute its communities as
viable homeplaces. 1 4
And as always, bridging the attorney-client gap and formulating
a new relationship is grounded in "respecting the client community's
... humanity." 105  Like re-socialization, Calmore sees these
humanistic relationships as essential to the practice of social justice
law.
D. Social Justice Writing
Once an attorney learns to build this type of relationship with
clients, I suspect it becomes a lesson she never forgets. The emphasis
on community dignity, respect, humanity, and collaboration
fundamentally altered how I approached relationships with clients
and remained at the forefront of my mind after I left law school. The
more difficult part, at which I cannot claim to have been as successful,
was consistently extending those lessons into the courtrooms, trial
briefs, appellate briefs, and other documents.
One of Calmore's major exercises in his social justice lawyering
course requires students to draft a "social justice complaint" based on
103. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1950.
104. Id. at 1956.
105. Id. at 1955.
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Herbert Eastman's theory of "thick pleading.""° The purpose is to
draft the complaint in a tone, language, and story that does not
reduce the clients to mere names on the pleading, nor their claim of
injustice to a narrow legal cause of action. 7 Instead, a social justice
complaint illuminates who the clients are and the nature of the
injustice from which they suffer.' Eastman points out that the
complaint is the first document courts see, and it shapes their view of
the entire case. 9 Thus, the complaint is a lawyer's best chance to
educate, inform, and persuade courts that are not predisposed to
identify with or understand the oppression that constricts
marginalized clients' lives.110
As writing is an attorney's primary mode of advocacy, drafting a
social justice complaint appears, at first glance, easier than building
bridges with communities dissimilar or distant from an attorney's
own. Although requiring a different tone and approach, a social
justice complaint is but another written legal document, which can
lead skilled attorneys to believe the task is easy enough to master.
Social justice lawyering with communities requires attorneys to
succumb to re-socialization and act in ways that may not be natural or
consistent with prearranged norms of lawyering. In contrast, drafting
a social justice complaint merely requires that attorneys approach
complaint drafting with an additional purpose. Nevertheless, drafting
a social justice complaint can prove to be the more difficult and
counterintuitive, particularly because the choice to use this method of
pleading signifies an attorney's personal stand and philosophy."' In
that respect, it challenges an attorney in ways that bridge-building
with clients does not.
First, a social justice complaint might be the most personal and
direct challenge that an attorney lodges against the legal system and
106. See Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 625-35 (discussing the
nature of the assignment and its purposes); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power.
The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 836-49 (1995) (explaining
"thick pleading").
107. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 626-27.
108. Id. at 626-27, 629.
109. Eastman, supra note 106, at 769-72.
110. Id. at 771 (finding that judges are unable to recognize injustice because they come
from extremely privileged backgrounds that "restrict [their] view" and prevent them from
"understand[ing] the problems sufficiently").
111. See Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 635 (describing the fears
attorneys might experience in filing these types of pleadings); id. at 631 (listing "dominant
expectations associated with professional role and socialization[,] ... convention and
tradition associated with being a lawyer[,] ... professional standards of practice[, and] self-
preservation" among the constraints of practicing social justice lawyering).
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his role in it. A social justice complaint simply defies the unstated
norms regarding what a complaint should look like. Consequently,
the complaint publicly opens the attorney up to criticism and disdain
from his peers and superiors, not as to who he represents, but how he
represents clients."' 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that
a complaint "shall contain... a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,""1 3 but the entire point of
a social justice complaint is to avoid a short and plain statement of the
claim and instead include the client's story or narrative. 14 Opposing
counsel is sure to object to various statements in a social justice
complaint as being: (1) statements of fact that she can neither admit
nor deny, (2) statements that warrant sanctions under Rule 11
because they are not based in fact,'15 or (3) statements that the court
should strike under Rule 12(f) because they fall under the category of
"impertinent, or scandalous matter."' 1 6  Lest anyone doubt that
opposing counsel would object, I still recall how vehemently two
students, fresh from their first year of law school, argued against the
appropriateness of thick pleading in Calmore's Social Justice
Lawyering class. Their response ironically embodies the professional
difficulty social justice attorneys will have with filing this type of
complaint.
Second, even if these procedural objections are not warranted-
and Eastman demonstrates they are not"T-social justice attorneys
may still find this type of pleading intellectually and personally
difficult: "Lawyers, schooled in legal reasoning, see a limited world in
which problems between people are discrete and legally defined," but
a social justice complaint requires that they abandon this approach
and conceptualize the dispute as being "social[ly] and politically
defined.""' 8 Moreover, by telling the client's story in its social and
political context, an attorney lends power to the client's voice at the
112. Id. at 635 (noting that lawyers filing thick pleadings "fear the backlash from the
Establishment").
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
114. See Eastman, supra note 106, at 813 ("It is the dynamic role of the narrative within
a legal argument-rather than the narrative standing alone, perhaps unheard-that gives it
persuasive force.").
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
117. Eastman, supra note 106, at 790-805 (explaining how a thick complaint is
acceptable according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other constraints of the
legal community).
118. Id. at 798 (citing Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 17, 25 (James Boyle ed., 1992)).
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expense of legal vocabulary and hierarchy.1 9 Thus, the social justice
complaint, again, inherently challenges lawyers' "own status and
power over clients,"'12 but this time in full view of others. In short,
the social justice lawyer "is asked to risk sanction and ostracism for
clients she may not even understand or know. When one's cause may
be perceived as radical, one may wisely appear conservative and
mainstream-to 'pass.' ,121
This same problem also arises in the way we attempt to sculpt
our clients' testimony in court, the very place where one would think
clients' stories are most relevant. Attorneys often distort clients'
stories with the premise that they are presenting the stories in a way
judges can understand, but the attorneys then lament for the courts
not seeing their clients properly or "hearing their stories correctly.' '22
The problem starts, however, with the fact that:
We need to begin educating the courts about our clients' lives
and stories .... We need to help the bench and bar recognize
that the indigent clients we serve are not just rich clients
dressed in cheaper clothes, but are people who have problems
uniquely their own, problems which until now the legal system
has refused to acknowledge. 23
Even among those young re-socialized attorneys who remain
"radical" enough to file social justice complaints or allow clients to
tell their stories in court, supervising attorneys are likely to express
skepticism over these tactics and encourage, if not require, a different
approach. The rest, regardless of supervision, will likely find the
standard "lawyerly" tasks of drafting and oral advocacy to be the
119. See id. (explaining how legal characterization of client stories and disputes
reinforces the legal system's dominance over clients). Anthony Alfieri, upon whom
Eastman relies, writes:
Client narratives are tolerated only to the extent they do not rupture the ordered
system of meanings and relationships defined by lawyer narratives. When rupture
is threatened by client resistance, the lawyer engages in a series of interpretive
moves to restore hierarchy by characterizing client story in the vocabulary of
dependence.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2126 (1991) (citations omitted).
120. Eastman, supra note 106, at 798.
121. Id. at 804.
122. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 630 (quoting Michelle S.
Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345,402 (1997)).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
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most difficult to incorporate into their practice as social justice
lawyers.
E. The Battle To Keep Hope Alive
Finally, students need not assume that their task is easy or that
failure only befalls those who are faint of spirit; far too many good
committed attorneys have already suffered from exhaustion and
defeat for that to be the case. The plain truth, as Calmore regularly
hearkens, is "this work ... ain't easy."'24 For instance, "in a racist
culture, it is very hard to litigate, negotiate, and maintain antiracist
legal remedies, let alone employ them to shift culture."'25 Likewise,
attorneys bring their own set of incompetencies, privileges, and
preconceptions, over which they are apt to trip to the detriment of
their clients. Thus, students must disabuse themselves of the notion
of the dramatic or charismatic attorney who can simply rely on will
and skill to undermine injustice.
Professors, however, must be similarly careful not to discourage
students while responsibly apprising them of the realities and
adversity they will encounter. The result that follows from students'
discouragement may be worse than leaving them to their naivet6.
Too often students and practitioners become exhausted or
intimidated by the structural forces of oppression that social justice
lawyering reveals. Thus, the task of social justice professors must be
more than simply to expose and socialize students, but also to steel
them. Otherwise, we threaten to saddle them with a psychology of
failure and what Calmore calls an "excessive identification with Don
Quixote and/or Sisyphus."'26 If they are to become practicing social
justice lawyers,'27 he writes "we must solidify [rather than undermine]
the commitment of progressive students. We must move liberal
students as far to the left as they can go ... [and] develop a critical
consciousness among those in the center.1128
The best way to solidify our students-but the one in which we
may too often fail due to our own pessimism-is to inspire them and
broaden their sense of what is possible. For those of us who practiced
124. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1173.
125. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1098.
126. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 631.
127. Calmore's textbook invokes Jane Aiken's call for students to become
"provocateurs for justice," meaning that they become "justice ready" and are prepared to
recognize injustice for what it is and then initiate action and inspire others to oppose it.
MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 214-15 (citing Jane H. Aiken,
Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 290-91 (2001)).
128. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1193.
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or grew up after the height of the civil rights movement, we ourselves
can stand in the way of our students. We may be too apt to project
our own disappointments and frustrations in class and, likewise, fall
victim to a constricting notion of what is possible. If we cannot
overcome this, surely our students will follow our outward, even if
unintended, expressions to their logical ends. Mindful of the course
materials' effect on students, Calmore specifically structures the
readings in his class to manage students' reactions. He devotes the
first weeks of class to visions of justice, leaving cases and specific
issues of injustice for later, "because so many of the cases tend to
depress students who hope to practice on behalf of subordinated
people."'29 Thus, the course largely begins, not with how the world is,
but with how it should be.
When students later reach the depth and reality of injustice, the
course is careful to emphasize that existing norms and systems " 'do
not exhaust the range of possibilities.' "I" In essence, norms are
neither inherent nor obvious. If students can see beyond existing
norms and systems, they can begin to see the course, not as an intense
course in the reality and inevitability of oppression, but as an exercise
in "the practice of freedom."'' This practice in freedom also allows
them to "more readily embrace and commit to the earlier described
visions of justice."'32 The best students then may find more possibility
and promise in the world than their teachers do.
In Calmore's experience, inspired students traverse the hard
realities of oppression and injustice, yet leave the course wanting "to
bring voting rights cases to empower and enhance the political
influence of people of color; bring housing and employment
discrimination cases, not defend them; they want to press affirmative
action to reverse racism.""'i3 Moreover, those students stand in stark
contrast to others who take doctrinal courses in antidiscrimination or
constitutional law and can see nothing more than the constriction of
legal rights." In short, courses in social justice are balancing acts
between realization and inspiration. They must include a strong dose
129. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 912.
130. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1109 (quoting CRAIG
CALHOUN, CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DIFFERENCE, at xviii (1995)).
131. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 913.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (noting that a "broader cross-section of the student body," both politically and
ideologically, in those doctrinal courses can lead to polarized discussions that discourage
open-mindedness).
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of the latter for students to understand the task before them, yet
willingly choose to pursue it.135
II. LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS RE-LEARNED, AND REFLECTIONS
ON SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERING
A. Practical Lessons
In the first years of practice, I tried to carry with me all the
lessons of social justice lawyering that I could. In fact, I felt that the
course, as Calmore promised, had put me "ahead of the curve. "136
Unfortunately, the opportunity to educate the court and tell clients'
stories through a complaint was not immediately available, but when
drafting other documents before the courts, such as findings of fact,
trial briefs, or appellate briefs, I struggled to find the clients'
messages.137 I would regularly focus on my language choice and try,
135. The experience of one of my social justice students demonstrates the depth of
students' realizations and the absolute necessity that hope accompany it. The student
admitted that she found many of the early readings "redundant ... because I believed that
I 'got it' after reading just a few articles.... I now realize how foolish and naive my
assumptions were." Journal Entry, Social Justice Lawyering Student, supra note 76, at *1.
Her final journal entry for the class, however, revealed a profound evolution during a
single semester. She began it by writing that she would characterize the course with the
single word "unexpected.... because I leave the course with lessons and impressions that
I never foresaw nor expected." Id. She then proceeds to discuss the theme of hope, which
ironically I had not stressed in that semester, but which emphasizes hope's importance to
social justice lawyering. Speaking of a pro bono project to assist victims of Hurricane
Katrina that students undertook through the class, she reflected:
I learned the related lesson that hope is oftentimes the collateral damage that
accompanies social justice violations.... I felt helpless when [the victims]
expressed their lack of hope in the legal system to provide any remedies to their
hardship. In retrospect, I think I too felt helpless because I agreed with their
outlook....
I wouldn't say that the people with whom I spoke have no hope for
themselves, but the amount that they do have has been injured [and] has taken on
loftier dimensions. The hope expressed to me was more apocalyptic; they talked
about faith that the righteous would be uplifted and the hurricane profiteers will
be laid low in some later space and time. Hope for immediate retribution seemed
almost non-existent. Yet hope, or the lack thereof, is very powerful. I have to
believe that there is still a chance, albeit small, for justice to emerge from this
horrendous situation. And given the stakes of human lives that are involved, this
small chance is worth fighting for.
Id. at *2-3.
136. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1174.
137. Even now in writing this piece, the lessons I have learned from social justice
lawyering cause me to struggle with the appropriate manner in which to reflect on my
experiences, in particular the way in which I now reveal and describe clients' stories. For
fear of disclosing too much, violating confidences, or telling the story in a way that clients
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for instance, to make strategic use of passive versus active voice verbs.
The passive seemed to present clients' oppression as existing, if at all,
as some vague, unidentifiable force. The active voice located the
source of that oppression with the individual decisionmakers who had
names, motivations, and stories of their own. Although more
forceful, the active voice would also require a court to pass judgment
on the values and decisions of a community, which at the trial level
might be very similar to or the same as the court's own, while the
passive voice-if the court could recognize the oppression as real-
might allow the court to pass judgment on the oppression rather than
the people. In the end, I tried to balance the two in light of my
appraisal of what courts were willing to hear. Social justice lawyering
had developed my sensibilities enough to recognize the conundrum,
but I often felt it provided me no answers.
In appellate courts, I likewise learned that for an appeal to have
any chance of success, the briefs had to center on the clients' stories.
Today's appellate courts are simply too far removed from and too
disinterested in most civil rights cases to give them serious treatment
if the briefs present them with nothing but bare facts and legal
arguments."' a Thus, I had to provide stories that explained what had
happened and was continuing to happen to the marginalized
communities. Although the cases in which I was involved achieved
mixed success, I continue to believe that it was only our clients'
stories that garnered the attention of appellate courts and created a
willingness to even entertain relief.
On more than one occasion, however, I came to the rude
awakening that my legal teams' shortcomings in telling clients' full
stories from the outset diminished the power of their cases. Because
the initial complaint frames the entire case and gains momentum once
it is filed, it simply becomes too difficult to change a case or a legal
team's course and tone later. Looking back now, I know that the
legal teams often waited too long to begin that process. By the time a
case reached trial, I was always uneasy about the way a court might
interpret a witness's testimony. Moreover, I hypothesized that
can no longer participate or collaborate, I have anesthetized and generalized my
experiences. For a further exploration of these concerns, see Binny Miller, Telling Stories
About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 40-45
(2000) (discussing the ethical issues involved in telling such stories).
138. Even basic first-year legal writing texts attempt to alert law students to this
principle, although in a less complicated way. See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 305-06, 310-
11 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing the need to make clients come alive in the trial court and the
need to make a claim of injustice, beyond just legal arguments, in the appellate courts).
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although witnesses were telling stories, a cultural or linguistic gap
often may have prevented courts from understanding them.13 9 The
stories of marginalized clients or witnesses carry with them a meaning
deeper and broader than the mere words that a court reporter can
catch) n" The deeper meaning can only be captured by one who
understands the context from which these stories were conveyed.
In those moments of uneasiness, I recalled the ever-resounding
retort from critical race theory classmates who demand to know how
they could use any of "this" in practice."' Unfortunately, even the
best professors do not always have a good response.142 Yet based on
139. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as
Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2470-73 (1989) (revealing the extent of the linguistic
gap between clients and attorneys or judges, and the resulting relationship between the
gap and the perception of which issues are important); Kim A. Taylor, Invisible Woman:
Reflections on the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 443, 449-50
(1993) (arguing that whites in general, and Senator Specter in particular, simply did not
understand the complexity of Anita Hill's story of sexual harassment and the intersection
of race and gender oppression). Gilkerson writes:
Contextualization is fundamental to legal storytelling; the storyteller must be able
to provide enough information about herself and her situation to transfer to the
story receiver-through meanings and images-her perspective, beliefs, and
values. The storytelling dilemma in law arises when authoritative discourse and
knowledge impede the transfer of the storyteller's meanings and images. Hence
the receiver's interpretive understanding of the story often is at odds with the
message intended by the teller.
Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 866 (1992).
140. See Cunningham, supra note 139, at 2479-82 (exploring the deeper meanings
behind simple words that we interpret or fail to interpret, depending on the amount of
linguistic resources we share with the speaker).
141. See generally McDougall, supra note 11, at 4-6 (admitting his own skepticism of
the subject matter's use and then later his students' need for practicality).
142. See Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1187 (acknowledging that it is
difficult to translate critical race theory into practice). Calmore further points to Peggy
Davis's comments that making scholarship useful for client communities is "daunting"
because critical race theorists are often " 'trying to solidify an optimism about limited
transformation.' " Id. (quoting Peggy Davis, Comments at the Panel Discussion on the
Application of Critical Race Theory to Progressive Practice, Critical Race Theory
Workshop, Phila., Pa. (June 1995)). Calmore, at times, implicitly concedes that critical
race theory is difficult for the professor, much less the student or practitioner, to grasp and
apply:
This scholarship is now quite broad-based. As it has evolved, it has attracted a
motley crew, and its body of scholarship is actually improvisationally incoherent,
diffuse, and stunningly eclectic in both method and message. Critical race theory
primarily investigates how the law contributes to and diminishes racial
subordination. Beyond that, it is harder to identify and, like rain, its fallout varies
in impact.
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lessons learned, I surmised that our clients' cases would be far more
difficult to ignore if they included testimony from a critical race
theorist, sociologist, or anthropologist who could provide the court
with the sociological and structurally oppressive context from which a
client's story came. 143 Such experts' perspectives could help narrow
the cultural and linguistic gaps between courts and clients, as well as
those that surely exist between lawyer and client. Likewise, a critical
perspective could unearth the underlying assumptions that everyone
in the courtroom might have about a client's story and deprive the
listener of the opportunity to interpret and later write the client's
story as he or she saw fit.'"
That such critical perspective was necessary became painfully
obvious during lunch with a witness one day. The witness was
Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 1592. At its core, critical race theory
represents an oppositional stance. Id. at 1593. However, that stance is existentially
determined by the people who take it, and how they then apply it is unbounded by any
rules or canon of scholarship.
143. See, e.g., Tanya Kateri Hernfndez, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment
Discrimination and the "Diversity" Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259, 304 (2007)
(suggesting the use of experts to help judges understand the nature of discrimination in a
specific workplace). Interestingly, studies in federal courts reveal that a significant
proportion of women and minority attorneys believe that they are disadvantaged in
relation to their male or white counterparts, but these attorneys nonetheless say it does
not affect how they present their cases. Carroll Seron, A Report of the Perceptions and
Experiences of Lawyers, Judges, and Court Employees Concerning Gender, Racial and
Ethnic Fairness in the Federal Courts of the Second Circuit of the United States, 1997 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 415, 437-38; see also Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C.
Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657, 1708 (1996)
(noting that female attorneys report inequality of treatment that "may undermine their
effectiveness as counsel"); Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the
D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189,
226-30 (1996) (presenting research findings on the effects of minority status on the
attorney's experience within the professional legal community); The Effects of Gender in
the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 745, 809-35 (1994) (analyzing the "complex picture of the ways in which
gender does-and does not-affect professional interactions within the Ninth Circuit").
144. Gary Blasi remarks that scholars have voluminously revealed the nature of
unconscious biases and how they are put to use in the law, but that with only minor
exceptions:
scholars have had much less to say to practicing lawyers and other advocates about
what to make of their insights, particularly in situations in which race is below the
surface.... Scholars and teachers of advocacy have also had little to say about
how advocates should deal with stereotyping or race. With one notable exception,
the leading law school textbooks on trial advocacy completely ignore the issues of
race and stereotyping, except in the context of cross-examining a witness to reveal
hidden bias.
Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1244-45 (2002) (footnote omitted).
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concerned with how the television had specifically referenced the
names of every client that had testified the day before. I had watched
the broadcast but had paid no attention to this fact and still was
unclear as to its ultimate significance. The witness said that other
witnesses would be less apt to testify or speak freely if they were
subject to being prominently identified and negatively characterized.
I am not sure that such witnesses ever expect a warm reception in
their local media, but this witness revealed that specific references to
witnesses' names meant that those who had to apply for a loan at the
bank, a job at the filling station, or an apartment at a local complex
next Monday were being told by the mere mention of their name that
their chances of obtaining those opportunities were reduced. At that
moment, I became more aware of my privilege than ever before,
more aware of the gap between client and lawyer, and able to
recognize that a client's story is far more complex than attorneys
imagine and is in need of full illumination in complaints, briefs, and
testimony. Unfortunately, it also brought on those Sisyphean
feelings,'45 as I marveled at how hard "provocateurs of justice" '146 must
work to achieve so little and to tell such familiar American stories. 147
B. Legal Lessons
The most disappointing lessons that were reified in practice were
the jurisprudential flaws in antidiscrimination law, particularly in
regard to the intentional discrimination standard.48 In practice, I
145. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 127.
147. Derrick Bell has written of how his work as a civil rights attorney was no more
leisurely than that of an associate grinding away toward partnership at a major law firm.
DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH 112
(2002). He also admits that the demands of the work resulted in personal sacrifices along
the way. Id. I had already learned that lesson far too well and was still willing to make
that sacrifice. My marvel, however, was with the substantive difficulty of our work.
Eastman writes that judges may be the least able of any to recognize injustice, because
most come from privileged backgrounds that "restrict [their] view" and require poor black
plaintiffs to paint "more vivid and complete pictures [in order for judges] to understand
the problems sufficiently." Eastman, supra note 106, at 771.
148. The intentional discrimination standard effectively requires proof of the
defendant's subjective motivation but, as several courts and commentators have noted,
proving subjective motivation is extremely difficult and unreliable. See, e.g., United States
v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that "[a]s a subjective test
would be impossible to apply ... the courts are driven to adopt an objective criterion" to
determine intent); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1047-48 (6th Cir. 1977)
(noting that "it would be difficult, and nigh impossible, for a district court to find"
intentional discrimination unless it is free to draw the inference based on objective
evidence). In fact, for that reason, several lower courts resisted the Supreme Court's
efforts to evolve the standard toward a subjective one. See Derek W. Black, The
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grew too accustomed to disappointing communities who suffered
from discrimination and inequality with my appraisal that they did
not have a legal claim because we would not be able to demonstrate
"intentional discrimination," as currently applied. 49 Not satisfied
with conveying that disappointment, or with the real-world effects of
the standard itself, I began attempting to formulate new claims for the
same old injustices. Unfortunately, as a practitioner with several live
cases and issues, I never had quite enough time to develop satisfying
solutions for systemic problems. However, as an academic, I have
spent a great deal of time and scholarship attempting to whittle away
at the intent doctrine. 5° Moreover, I believe that it is in similar
endeavors that we as professors can and must do more to assist
communities and practitioners.
As social justice professors, we implore our students that this
work is not just theoretical. They must be ready to spot injustice,
committed to collaborating and strategizing with the community, and
creative in integrating a legal claim within that strategy. The
creativity has two levels: integrating a legal claim within the
Contradiction Between Equal Protection's Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How
Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 565-66 (2006)
(describing how "courts continued to find that 'intent' could be shown with evidence short
of animus of specific racial purpose"). Currently, absent "smoking gun" evidence, most
plaintiffs cannot meet the standard. See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37,
50 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that it is "almost impossible" to prove subjective intent, except in
the case of admissions); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91, 112-26 (2003) (discussing cases that required smoking gun evidence).
149. For further discussion of the types of claims that lack viability and an analysis of
the current intentional discrimination standard, see Black, supra note 148, at 534-38.
150. See generally Black, supra note 148 (demonstrating the intentional discrimination
standard's inability to produce results consistent with equal protection's original meaning
and proposing a new standard in its place); Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next
Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (using tort principles to demonstrate that the
choice-of-liability standards in antidiscrimination law is not limited to a dichotomy
between disparate impact and intentional discrimination, and that the conversation must
include a focus on public policy rather than moralistic notions of fault); Derek W. Black,
The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court's Expanded Concept of
Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Black, Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action]
(identifying the implicit principles and bases upon which the Supreme Court has recently
recognized statutory claims of discrimination and demonstrating that those principles and
bases would support broader causes of action under antidiscrimination statutes than the
traditional notion of intentional discrimination); Derek Black, Picking up the Pieces After
Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81
N.C. L. REV. 356 (2002) (suggesting three ways in which plaintiffs can circumvent the
Supreme Court's holding that Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 implies no
private right of action for intentional discrimination).
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communities' larger agenda and formulating a viable claim. By the
time students leave our constitutional law, antidiscrimination, and
social justice courses, they are all too aware that oppressed
communities' legal claims are limited and growing narrower.151
Moreover, scholars have adeptly demonstrated how the narrowing of
these claims represents bias, decontextualization, a lack of
understanding, and maintenance of structural inequality.'52 The
academy, however, has not been as adept at using its scholarship to
provide the missing pieces of the puzzle that students and
practitioners often need to formulate new claims and theories. We
consistently take oppositional stances with our students, but do not
consistently help them throw oppositional legal blows. Yet if ever
there were means by which to inspire our students, it is here.
Moreover, insofar as judges find not only our scholarship, but
scholarship in general, useless,153 we can make the theoretical
practical and the useless useful.
151. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that punitive damages
are unavailable in disability discrimination suits); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W.
Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (limiting the availability of
attorneys' fees in civil rights cases); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
(eliminating disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (permitting employers to compel
employees to enter into agreements submitting all civil rights claims against an employer
to arbitration).
152. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing that current antidiscrimination law reinforces structural
inequality because it focuses on the motive of the perpetrators rather than on conditions
that many defendants' conduct creates); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) ("A color-blind interpretation of the
Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political
advantages that whites hold over other Americans."); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
323 (1987) (contending that racial attitudes are engrained in the collective unconscious of
American citizens, and that therefore requiring intent as a prerequisite to any
discrimination claim means there is no legal remedy available for the vast majority of
discriminatory acts).
153. Adam Liptak writes:
In a cheerfully dismissive presentation, Judge Jacobs and six of his colleagues on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in a lecture hall
jammed with law professors at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law this month
that their scholarship no longer had any impact on the courts. The assembled
professors mostly agreed, though they differed about the reasons and about
whether the trend was also a problem. Some suggested, gently, that judges might
not have the intellectual curiosity to appreciate modern legal scholarship. Articles
in law reviews have certainly become more obscure in recent decades. Many law
professors seem to think they are under no obligation to say anything useful or to
say anything well. They take pride in the theoretical and in working in disciplines
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One of Calmore's most significant contributions has been
revealing the injustice and normative flaws in the law and policy
regarding housing and life opportunities for the inner-city poor. As
discussed above, the inner-city poor are trapped at the intersection of
race, space, and poverty where they often lead a life devoid of options
or hope. 5 4 Larger society is content to simply leave the inner-city
poor behind and cordon them off as irrelevant to the economy, policy,
and progress. Calmore identifies racism in general and white
indifference toward inner-city poverty in particular as the causes of
this social neglect. When "looking at the racial and ethnic data
regarding neighborhood poverty, [he is] struck by two things. First, it
is not really a significant problem for whites .... Second, for this
reason, racism may continue to cultivate broad societal neglect and
block efforts at grand-scale redress." '155 The unfortunate reality is that
"so many whites are indifferent to blacks."' 56  Some argue that
indifference is distinct from racism,'57 but Calmore asserts that the
indifference is "driven by bias, prejudice, and stereotype-by cultural
and institutional racisms."''
His scholarship, however, does not respond directly to this
indifference. In other contexts, Calmore argues that the
government's affirmative historical acts of housing discrimination
warrant spatial reparations for African American communities,159 but
as to the larger problem of white indifference, he seems to lack
confidence in the law. In fact, the following quote suggests that the
law is in some respects irrelevant:
As long as race makes no obvious demands on whites in these
terms, ironically, their everyday racism will continue to
other than their own. They seem to think the analysis of actual statutes and court
decisions-which is to say the practice of law-is beneath them.
Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8.
154. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1929-30.
155. Id. at 1942.
156. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1129.
157. See, e.g., PAUL L. WACHTEL, RACE IN THE MIND OF AMERICA: BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 35 (1999) (arguing there is a distinction
between indifference and racism).
158. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1129.
159. John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-
to-the-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1993) [hereinafter Calmore, Spatial
Equality] (supporting "a claim that territorial reparations would be a proper result"); see
also MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 857-84 (discussing and
including articles that detail the federal government's involvement in creating racial
inequity in home ownership and neighborhood resources).
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manifest itself in interpersonal relations, institutional
arrangements, and cultural expression. Certainly, we have no
chance to effectuate a real cultural-shift through lawmaking.
Nor is there an advancement of an anti-racist moral ideal or
standard. Perhaps most disconcerting, a stasis in current
cultural attitudes and patterns e:-ists that hampers progress
towards the goal of overarching justice for all peoples."6
It is here that Calmore comes closest to expressing a lack of hope
and creates the crack through which despair can creep, particularly
for our students. The most he offers in response to his own prognosis
is that others "argue that [his] narrative of progress understates the
racial improvement that marks the nation's cultural-shift on matters
of race and racism.' 161
The above is not a critique of Calmore, as I concur in the
problem of indifference and the difficulty of legal solutions. My
comments, however, are meant to emphasize the problems he and
others pose to us and the work they leave for us to complete. In his
course, for instance, he requires students to draft complaints against
the United States, premised on a theory of spatial reparations.1 62 I
similarly ask students to formulate creative legal theories to sustain
claims on behalf of marginalized clients who otherwise have no
recognized remedy. Yet neither students, practitioners, nor their
professors have fully resolved the legal hurdles to various and
recurring social justice claims that they need to make. Of course, the
teacher cannot provide legal solutions for every problem, but I
believe we must do more to support students in their effort.
For instance, insofar as societal indifference is born from racism,
and Calmore and John Payne are correct that "[o]ur society simply
would not tolerate the amount of poverty found in black and other
minority communities if whites were proportionally as poor as these
less-favored groups, "163 we cannot accede that equal protection and
antidiscrimination law sanction this indifference. Even if current
precedent holds otherwise, we cannot simply tell our students,
colleagues, and communities that we voice opposition to the
proposition, but can offer them no assistance; we must advocate,
educate, and create through scholarship and other means until the
160. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1102.
161. Id. at 1102 n.68 (referencing STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM,
AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 499 (1997)).
162. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1201 n.120.
163. John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair
Housing?, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 361, 370 (1988).
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courts also recognize that the law does not, and must not, sanction
this racially unequal indifference.
To use a favorite adage of civil rights attorneys from earlier
generations, when Brown was decided, not only were whites
indifferent, they were entrenched in a culture that was explicitly racist
and a legal system that had for over half a century held that "enforced
separation of the races ... neither abridges the privileges or
immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without
due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws,
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."" 6  In
comparison, our outlook today should be bright.
In all fairness, the basis for relative optimism does not necessarily
portend significant successes, but as the earlier quote from President
Havel indicates, the promise of success cannot be the barometer of
our effort and commitment.165 We must push new legal claims
because they are right, not because they will win.166 I cannot claim it
to have been my original purpose, but two of my recent articles on the
intent standard purport to shed some light on the white indifference
towards which Calmore looks with pessimism. 67 In proposing re-
articulations of the intent standard and new claims, those articles do
not suggest that new claims are easily established. They do, however,
argue that social justice lawyers and the communities they represent
do not stand alone in opposition to indifference and neglect, but that
the law stands with them.
For instance, one article argues that equal protection's original
and evolved meaning demonstrates a single fundamental concept:
[A]II are equally entitled to the consideration and protection of
the law. Consequently, the interests of none [can be] denied
value or afforded a differential value when the government
weighs competing interests or ends, particularly in regard to
race. Even the infamous decision in Roberts v. City of Boston,
which later served as a basis for the Court's holding in Plessy,
recognized .. . that equality before the law required "that the
rights of all ... are equally entitled to the paternal consideration
164. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
165. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
166. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1273.
167. See Black, supra note 148, at 575-85 (advocating that a modified deliberate
indifference standard would better reflect the meaning and purpose of equal protection);
Black, Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action, supra note 150 (demonstrating that
some more subtle forms of indifference by recipients of federal funds, even if not racially
or gender-motivated, may amount to violations of statutes such as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments).
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and protection of the law, for their maintenance and security."
It is the failure of equal consideration that strikes at the heart of
equal protection. This failure can be obvious when it is
motivated by animus or far more subtle when it lacks
motivation and is a result of "racially selective sympathy and
indifference" or unconscious feelings of differential worth
between racial groups. On their face, decisions may appear
legitimate when they are actually the result of "the unconscious
failure to extend to a minority ... the same sympathy and care,
given as a matter of course to one's own group." Although
selective sympathy or indifference and differential appraisals of
worth are difficult to identify, they are no less pernicious to the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal concern and
respect in the design and administration of the political
institutions that govern them. 168
Thus, insofar as the intent standard fails to provide this type of
equal protection, it must be expanded or abandoned. 169 In its place or
incorporated within it, the article proposes a deliberate indifference
standard (similar in name to current deliberate indifference standards
but significantly dissimilar in application) as being appropriate.17°
Equally important, laws and standards consistent with those
proposed above have the capacity to work the cultural shifts that
Calmore associates with the Warren Court and finds necessary for
significant and sustainable progress. 71 For instance, a deliberate
indifference standard that queries whether the government is
cognizant of the harm it causes, whether it has available options to
avoid that harm, and whether it would have avoided the harm had the
affected group been white, is a standard that reflects the way
decisions are actually made. The current intent standard only
requires that we not be openly racist; it does not demand that
government treat its citizens equally. In contrast, by requiring
government to be cognizant of the harms it causes, a deliberate
indifference standard combats less explicit forms of bias or racism
168. Black, supra note 148, at 562 (footnotes omitted) (quoting, respectively, Roberts
v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976); Id. at 7-8; JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 82 (1980)).
169. Id. at 564-77; see also Lawrence, supra note 152, at 319-23 (critiquing the intent
standard and arguing for a standard that addresses unconscious racism in its place).
170. Black, supra note 148, at 575-86.
171. See Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1098-103 (explaining that




that are the predominant causes of unequal treatment.7 2 Moreover,
calling those considerations to the forefront provides the potential for
cultural change.
We lament the intent doctrine's exclusive focus on racial animus
because such animus is no longer the predominant form of
discrimination,173 but we likewise recognize that racial animus's
diminished prevalence is, in part, a result of the consensus and
precedent that deemed it both socially and legally unacceptable. 17 4
Thus, it follows that if the structure of the law can call us to account
for our indifference to one another, it can minimize the continued
prevalence of that indifference. Insofar as we share Calmore's hope
and faith in humanity, we must believe that our government and
individual decisionmakers would react to such laws by changing the
way they approach decisions. They can resist the urge to be
indifferent to the needs of some and explore alternative courses of
action that do not cause avoidable racial harms. This alone will not
eliminate racism, oppression, or the problems of the inner-city poor,
but it will move us forward; it can prevent us from carelessly writing
off others. This is but one example of how we should put our
scholarship to rectifying, in addition to identifying, injustice.
III. SUSTAINING SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERS: To TEACH A NEW
LESSON OF HOPE
My experience teaching and working with social justice students
affirms the need for Calmore's attentiveness to the emotional
responses that students have to the readings and issues we address in
social justice lawyering. Predominantly confined to law school
buildings and long reading assignments, students do not instinctively
find hope in humanity, grass-roots collaboration, or simple necessity.
These things often remain but words in a book. Most students have
172. See Blasi, supra note 144, at 1246-66 (discussing psychological studies and
scholarship on stereotypes and bias); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) (discussing the flaws in disparate
treatment theory and questioning traditional conceptions of discrimination as a
manifestation of intent or motive). See generally Lawrence, supra note 152 (focusing on
the prevalence of unconscious racism).
173. See Green, supra note 148, at 95-97 (discussing the shift in the nature of
discrimination from conscious animus to unconscious bias); Krieger, supra note 172, at
1164-65 (stating that "deliberate discrimination [was] prevalent in an earlier age" but
"subtle forms of bias ... represent today's most prevalent type of discrimination" and,
thus, the old legal standards are insufficient).
174. Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-82 (1988).
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not yet had those experiences and revelations that reify or build hope
in those pillars. Since students live within law books and are, after all,
lawyers in training, they often ask for at least a sliver of hope in the
law books themselves. I believe we can and must answer them.
Our response cannot be to paint false pictures or understate the
conservative trends in the law, but likewise we cannot allow our
students to succumb to notions of futility or career changes.175 I
believe there is at least as much reason for them to hope as to despair,
if we can just reveal it. The state of today's law-and some might
argue the general state for some time-is akin to Charles Dickens'
description from A Tale of Two Cities that it was both the "best of
times" and the "worst of times." '176 Today's law is in perpetual
evolution and still provides principles that should inspire and
invigorate both us and our students. Calmore, for instance, directs us
toward grassroots coalitions in Los Angeles,'77  multicultural
projects, 78 the creative exploits of students in individual cases,179 and
simply the increasing number of lawyers doing this work,' 80 but I
would also answer our students' pleas for hope in the law by directing
them toward the decisions of our highest courts, the positions of our
most visible institutions, and the cultural shifts that are both following
and leading the law.
Hope can be found in the law. Although an unfortunate truth
exists in Calmore's conclusion that the Warren Court's "law-making
legacy faces premature death" and that "much of the promise of
Brown has now disappeared, '1 8' those statements do not express a
finality or absoluteness. Most important, another less recognized and
heralded legacy persists from Brown and the Warren Court. To grasp
it, we must first understand from whence we came and tell the story
from a perspective grounded in history.
A. The Successful Lesson of Brown v. Board of Education
The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, like many other
educational institutions, did not joyfully renounce or abandon its
history of segregation and discrimination. Although founded in 1817,
the University did not admit its first African American students until
175. See Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 912 (discussing despair among
students).
176. See DICKENS, supra note 1, at 7.
177. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1254-70.
178. Id.
179. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy, supra note 26, at 636-38.
180. Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1174-75.
181. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1111.
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after the Civil War, well over half a century later." Even then, the
University segregated its students in housing and sanctioned the
exclusion of African Americans from fraternity and sorority life. 83
Over the objection of internal committees, students, coalitions, and
organizations in Michigan, the University continued its discriminatory
practices for another century and into the 1960s. 1"4 Finally, in 1963,
the University made a minor gesture toward African Americans by
expressing its intent to recruit and admit what it called "socially
disadvantaged" students, though this label suggested the University
was still uncomfortable with altering its racial mission.185
Despite the University's unwelcoming gestures and exclusion of
minorities from campus activities and programs, minority enrollment
modestly increased. 8 6  Consequently, the Governor and Senate
Committee on Student Affairs recommended changes to financial aid
to further increase minority enrollment, but the University rejected
the recommendation.'87 Under pressure from a student strike, the
University finally agreed to limited changes. 8  Yet, the University
abandoned its commitment to change in 1973.189 All the while,
discriminatory and racially hostile practices persisted on campus, and
the University refused to intervene. 9 °
Thirty years later, however, the University demonstrated a
drastically different approach to educating students. By 2003, the
University had not only adopted, but fought for, principles
antithetical to those it previously held for over a century and a half.
Before the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger9' and Gratz v.
Bollinger,"9 the University argued that a racially diverse student body
is "an integral component of its mission" because diversity
"increase[s] the intellectual vitality of [its] education, scholarship,
182. Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 9-10, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 367216.
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 10-11. "In 1954, there were fewer than 200 African Americans attending
the University. By 1966, 400 Black students were enrolled, still representing only 1.2 per
cent of the total student population of about 32,000. At the same time, nearly 55 per cent
of Detroit's 300,000 elementary and secondary school students were African American."
Id. at 11 n.13.
187. Id. at 11.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 12.
191. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
192. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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service, and communal life." '193 The University further argued that
without the presence of meaningful numbers of minority students on
campus, the appropriate interracial and diversity interactions-and
the educational benefits they foster-cannot take place. 94 Thus, the
University asked the Supreme Court to allow it to enroll more, not
fewer, African American and minority students. In addition, not only
did the University of Michigan take this newfound position, but
universities across the nation followed its lead.19 Fortune 500
companies, military generals, and numerous constituencies also joined
them. 196
In juxtaposing Grutter with Brown, the irony could be no greater.
Brown was a battle by disempowered African American communities
and the then-small NAACP Legal Defense Fund against entrenched
and empowered white institutions across the nation. 97 In the lead-up
to Brown, the University of Texas, for instance, so earnestly wanted
to keep blacks out of its flagship law school that it was willing to build
a new law school at great cost and inefficiency, and to defend its
discriminatory practices in litigation all the way to the Supreme
Court.19 Thus, Grutter and Gratz signal that we have gone from a
nation educated by institutions that used race to exclude to one of
institutions that want to use race to include.199 Moreover, this
193. Brief for Respondents at 2, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516),
2003 WL 402237 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4a, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516)).
194. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16.
195. See, e.g., Brief for American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 316 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399070; see
also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 ("Public and private universities across the Nation have
modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-
conscious policies.").
196. See, e.g., Brief for the American Sociological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (02-241), 2003 WL 398313; Brief for Ass'n
of American Medical Colleges et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (02-241), 2003 WL 398338; Brief for Members & Former Members of
Pennsylvania General Assembly and Pennsylvania Civic Leaders as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (02-241), 2003 WL 402090; Consolidated
Brief for Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (02-241), 2003 WL 1787554; Brief for 65 Leading
American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (02-
241), 2003 WL 399056.
197. For a full discussion of the struggle towards Brown, see generally RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
198. See generally Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
199. Justice Breyer relies on this shift as a basis for finding strict scrutiny should not
apply to voluntary desegregation efforts in elementary and secondary schools that rely on
[Vol. 86
2008] SOCIAL JUSTICE CURRICULUM 713
inclination is not born of ambivalence. Rather, Grutter and Gratz
involved a predominantly and historically white institution placing its
reputation, resources, and time on the line to defend the belief that
the inclusion of racial minorities in higher education is crucial to the
future of our nation.200  Although many were quietly pessimistic and
some nearly ready to concede defeat, 0 the Supreme Court was
swayed by the University and agreed that indeed the University "has
a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. ' ,21 We may
lament the fact that the cases were subject to close votes or that such
cases are even brought at all, but we cannot view the reversal of
perspectives-and the Court's endorsement of that reversal-as
anything other than a sign of hope in the law. And, this hope rings
true, not merely because of the good natures of men and institutions,
but because of the cultural shift that undoubtedly has arisen as a
result of Brown and the Warren Court.20 3
The same sentiment and lessons resonate from the Court's
decision this past term in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1.20  Two school systems had formerly
segregated their students. 05 Jefferson County, Kentucky imposed
race to achieve their goal. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. - - 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2818-20 (2007).
200. The University of Michigan's effort in defending its program was Herculean in
some respects. The University hired legal counsel from the nation's top law firms,
undertook extensive research to substantiate its position regarding diversity, and publicly
defended its program without excuse or fail. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811,
811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (recognizing the extensive expert testimony provided by the
University and listing John A. Payton, John H. Pickering, and Jane Sherburne from the
major law firm Wilmer, Cutler in Washington, D.C., as counsel for the University). The
best illustration of the University's strong effort to defend itself may be the Expert
Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin. See generally Expert Report of Patricia Gurin,
Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (No. 97-75321), 1998 WL 35140040, reprinted in 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 363 (1999) (showing positive correlations between increased cross-racial
student interactions and several learning, democracy, and living and working outcomes).
201. But see Adam Cohen, Why Justice O'Connor Could Be Affirmative Action's
Unlikely Savior, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2003, § 4, at 12.
202. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
203. See Derek Black, Beyond Brown: Its Impact upon American Education and
Culture, NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., Mar-Apr. 2004, at 14.
204. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
205. See id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2747, 2749. The Seattle school district was never
segregated by law, but the segregation there was de jure nonetheless. In Seattle,
[a]lthough black students made up about 3% of the total Seattle population in the
mid-1950's, nearly all black children attended schools where a majority of the
population was minority....
... In 1956, a memo for the Seattle School Board reported that school
segregation reflected not only segregated housing patterns but also school board
policies that permitted white students to transfer out of black schools while
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school segregation by law, only halting its explicit segregation and
discrimination in response to a court order in 1972.206 A court order
remained in place until 2000.207 Likewise, Seattle did not express the
slightest willingness to desegregate until plaintiffs brought a federal
lawsuit in 1969 alleging that the Seattle school district intentionally
segregated its students.2 ° It took another legal complaint in 1977
before the district engaged in, any meaningful efforts to
desegregate. 9
Yet during their period of desegregation, both school districts
learned the lesson of Brown. By 2000, neither was under any legal
obligation to desegregate their schools, but both had come to believe
that racial integration was good for all their students and
communities.10 Consequently, the school districts took action to
voluntarily desegregate. Shortly thereafter, they found themselves in
court, not because the schools objected to desegregation efforts, but
because they refused to accede to those private individuals who
would undermine their efforts to desegregate.
restricting the transfer of black students into white schools. In 1958, black parents
whose children attended Harrison Elementary School (with a black student
population of over 75%) wrote the Seattle board, complaining that the
" 'boundaries for the Harrison Elementary School were not set in accordance with
the long-established standards of the School District ... but were arbitrarily set
with an end to excluding colored children from McGilvra School, which is adjacent
to the Harrison school district.' "
Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In 1963, the NAACP forced the school
board to adopt a new race-based transfer policy to attempt to ameliorate the segregation,
but the effect was minimal. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2803. Finally, in 1969 the board agreed
to "a plan that required race-based transfers and mandatory busing," id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at
2803, in response to a federal lawsuit against the school board claiming that the school
board had created a segregated system by
"mak[ing] and enforc[ing]" certain "rules and regulations," in part by "drawing...
boundary lines" and "executing school attendance policies" that would create and
maintain "predominantly Negro or non-white schools," and in part by building
schools "in such a manner as to restrict the Negro plaintiffs and the class they
represent to predominantly Negro or non-white schools."
Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2803 (alteration in original) (quoting a 1969 complaint filed by the
NAACP against the Seattle School Board).
206. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2806-10.
207. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2806-10.
208. Id. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2803.
209. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2804.
210. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224,
1232 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (quoting the school district's diversity rationale); McFarland v.
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (discussing the
district's compelling interest in integrating its schools).
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Had the country and courts committed more fully to
desegregation in the years immediately following Brown, Seattle and
Jefferson County may not have even been segregated school districts
as late as 2000. In fact, because of waning commitments, many
schools are as segregated today as they were in 1970,211 and in that
respect, the promise of Brown has unquestionably fallen short. Yet
the promise of Brown may have exceeded our expectations in other
respects, namely that Seattle and Jefferson County are not alone in
their newfound commitment to desegregation. Several other school
districts have followed their lead212 and, thus, inspiration and hope
persist. Moreover, although such exceptions do not create their own
rule, these cases respectfully challenge the general and continued
applicability of Calmore's conclusion that for whites, white space is
not a problem and black space is somewhere else and irrelevant.213
We can also find hope, not only in the litigants' stances, but also
in the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved. Justice
Kennedy's opinion, which forms the controlling opinion in the case,
admittedly gives rise to several practical and jurisprudential
problems.214 At the same time, however, it includes some profound
211. See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 13, at app.
212. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Cmty., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (adjudicating a
public school's voluntary desegregation program); Brief for the Council for the Great City
Schools et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. -, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2882698 (identifying amici as being additional
school districts that operate or support voluntary desegregation plans); LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION, A MANUAL FOR PARENTS,
EDUCATORS, AND ADVOCATES 20-25 (2005), available at http://www.civilrights
project.ucla.edu/resources/manual/manual.pdf (describing the move to voluntary
desegregation and programs schools have embraced).
213. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1234. Calmore's insight was largely
directed toward housing segregation, but interestingly, the Jefferson County school board
in Parents Involved indicated that, as a result of their racially inclusive school assignment
policies, they had witnessed a stabilization of housing segregation and actually a slight
reversal of it. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., decided sub nom. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-915), 2006
WL 3486966. Thus, at least in some small respect, Parents Involved demonstrates that the
school did not want to protect white space or ignore black space in the schools, and the
effect was a slightly less prized value on white space in housing.
214. Several law review articles are sure to follow and address these problems, but it
suffices to say that the desegregative measures Kennedy proposes are not necessarily new
and may prove more difficult to implement and less effective than the measures the
schools were already employing. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2828
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Second, as I will address in a separate article, Justice Kennedy's
analysis is flawed insofar as he interprets the school districts' assignment policies as
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race. Rather, the decisions are group-
based, race-conscious decisions, which he says would otherwise not even be subject to
strict scrutiny. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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statements that none could have expected. As background to
Kennedy's opinion, Calmore's analysis of the disappearance of
Brown's promise and the death of the Warren Court's legacy
concludes that a judicial retrenchment has occurred and includes: (1)
"an adoption of race neutrality, or colorblindness, as a paramount
principle" and (2) "a rejection of societal discrimination as a wrong to
be redressed. '215  Likewise, scholars from across the ideological
spectrum would have generally concurred in believing that a majority
of the Court, even before the addition of Justices Roberts and Alito,
accepted colorblindness as the guiding principle of equal protection
law.216 The rejection of remedying societal discrimination seemed
even stronger, as the Court had stated in various decisions that
"alleviat[ing] the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling
interest. "217
As to these and other principles, however, Kennedy's opinion
turns the world upside down.218  He writes: "The enduring hope is
that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does....
The plurality's postulate that '[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race' is not
sufficient to decide these cases., 219 He follows by applauding Justice
Harlan's statement in dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson220 that "[o]ur
215. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1111.
216. See generally Gotanda, supra note 152 (critiquing the dominance of the paradigm
of colorblindness in Supreme Court jurisprudence); Conference, Race Law and Justice:
The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 568-645 (1996)
(providing a transcript of various law professors discussing the Court's colorblindness
jurisprudence).
217. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); see also City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-99 (1989) (holding that past societal discrimination alone
was not enough to justify the use of race in contracting programs); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Societal discrimination, without
more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy"); id. at 288
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A] governmental
agency's interest in remedying 'societal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not
traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass
constitutional muster.").
218. In response to the claim at a recent conference that the sky is not falling, I
emphasized to the audience that the conservative plurality would have certainly had the
sky fall. The plurality's discussion of what interests justify race-conscious remedies and
what those remedies might be, although not directly overruling Grutter, suggest that the
plurality, if joined by Kennedy on the rules of law, would have effectively overturned
Grutter. Derek W. Black, Remarks at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting (July 29, 2007) (outline of comments on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
219. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2768 (plurality opinion)).
220. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Constitution is color-blind, 2' but then concludes that "[i]n the real
world, it is regrettable to say, [colorblindness] cannot be a universal
constitutional principle. 222  Thus, Kennedy repudiates the
conservative plurality's colorblind approach and dramatically shifts
the Court's rhetoric in a new direction. For this reason, Kennedy's
statements are likely to reverberate through progressive briefs and
scholarship across the country, as well as the Supreme Court's own
opinions that side with social justice.
Kennedy, although not stating it explicitly, also undermines as a
universal principle the notion that government cannot act to remedy
societal discrimination. 23 The conservative plurality argues that these
school districts cannot use race to voluntarily desegregate because
they have already discharged their duty to remedy their past
intentional segregation; thus, their current actions are no more than
racial balancing in an attempt to "remedy[] past societal
discrimination. ' 224  Kennedy's opinion breaks from the traditional
practice of deferring to and respecting school districts' discretion in
effectuating desegregation2 25 but his opinion nonetheless eschews the
plurality's rigidity that would hamstring those school districts. He
concludes:
221. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
222. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
223. Interestingly, Kennedy draws a distinction between de jure segregation and de
facto segregation, which he views as being caused by societal discrimination and thus
beyond the power of courts to remedy. Id. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2795. However, as
demonstrated below, he nonetheless holds that schools can use race to remedy de facto
segregation. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2791.
224. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 (plurality opinion). The plurality argues: "Jefferson
County phrases its interest as 'racial integration,' but integration certainly does not require
the sort of racial proportionality reflected in its plan. Even in the context of mandatory
desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required and here
Jefferson County has already been found to have eliminated the vestiges of its prior
segregated school system." Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2759 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
225. During court-ordered desegregation, the Supreme Court always stressed that the
decision as to how to desegregate resided with schools and that courts must defer to them
and return autonomy to them expeditiously. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
744 (1974) (expressing concern over depriving schools of local control); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("School authorities are
traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy.");
Green v. New Kent Co., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (placing the duty of desegregation on
school boards); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (noting that
"primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving th[e] problems" of
desegregation rests with "school authorities").
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School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open
to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school
districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the
plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state
and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial
isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.2 6
Some Supreme Court Justices, several scholars, and most civil
rights advocates argue that the distinction between de jure and de
facto school segregation is illusory.227 Nevertheless, the Court has
attempted to proffer a distinction: de jure segregation is attributable
to state action and, consequently, warrants judicial remedy, while de
facto segregation is attributable to demographic factors (e.g., societal
discrimination) and is beyond the reach of the judiciary.2 8 Thus,
Kennedy's conclusion that remedying the effects of de facto
segregation is a compelling government interest that justifies schools'
use of race-conscious measures, paired with his above-quoted
statement, represents a concession permitting school districts to
remedy societal discrimination in some instances. 29 Consequently, he
226. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
227. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 762-80 (White, J., dissenting) (refusing to limit a
desegregation remedy to the de jure segregated school district and arguing that the
surrounding school districts were also subject to desegregation orders as agencies of the
state); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 227, 228 n.12 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[A]II racial segregation ... has at some time been supported or
maintained by government action."); Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 435-37 (1972) (contending
that de jure and de facto segregation share many of the same negative qualities);
Nathaniel R. Jones, The Judicial Betrayal of Blacks-Again: The Supreme Court's
Destruction of the Hopes Raised by Brown v. Board of Education, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
109, 117 (2004) ("[T]he distinction between 'de facto' and 'de jure' segregation was
illusory."); Donald E. Lively, Desegregation and the Supreme Court: The Fatal Attraction
of Brown, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649, 658-59 (1993) ("Of particular long-term
significance was the Court's illusory distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation."); Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of
Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1330 (1991) ("Differentiation between de
jure and de facto segregation.., is largely illusory.").
228. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (attributing racial imbalances in the
schools to demographic shifts and, thus, beyond the responsibility of the school district);
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744-45 (holding that a district court could not order a remedy that
included the surrounding school districts because the litigants failed to prove that the
intentional acts of the school district caused the resulting segregation in those other
surrounding school districts).
229. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). This concession is more apparent when one further
compares Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved to his opinion in Grutter, where he
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pushes beyond the conventional wisdom regarding the Court's
judicial retrenchment.
Were that not enough to inspire hope, Kennedy reaches one final
surprising conclusion. The plurality concludes that all race-conscious
policies and remedies warrant review under strict scrutiny.Y0 In fact,
this very principle has been the central battleground in affirmative
action cases for nearly two decades, 3 with the Court in every
instance applying strict scrutiny. 32 Justice Kennedy, however, writes
that school districts "are free to devise race-conscious measures to
address the problem [of de facto segregation] in a general way" and, if
their measures do not classify individual students by race, "it is
unlikely [they] would demand strict scrutiny. 233  Thus, for the first
time in nearly two decades, five Justices sit on the Court who openly
agree to exclude certain uses of race from strict scrutiny. The last
time the Supreme Court even came close to suggesting as much was
in Metro Broadcasting v. F.C. C. ,234 which was decided before the
Court had first established that strict scrutiny applies even to the
government's purportedly benign uses of race.235
accepted Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke merely as precedent that controlled the
compelling interest question and where the compelling interest was unrelated to societal
discrimination. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). In Grutter, he was antagonistic toward the University and questioned the
Court's deference toward it, id. at 388, whereas in Parents Involved, he was willing to defer
to the school in several respects, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (noting
a number of means through which school boards may pursue the goal of diversity).
230. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2764.
231. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 234-35 (1995)
(focusing on the neutrality of equal protection and rejecting the notion that affirmative
action permitted more leeway), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493-95 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny is applied to any racially based classification
regardless of who benefits), with id. at 536-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (articulating the
need to provide the government leeway in remedying past discrimination and inequality).
232. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 906-07 (1996); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222; Croson, 488 U.S. at
493.
233. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
234. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
235. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court only applied intermediate scrutiny, reasoning
from precedent that
when a program employing a benign racial classification is adopted by an
administrative agency at the explicit direction of Congress, we are "bound to
approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch
charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide for the. . . general Welfare
of the United States and to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."
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The significance of Kennedy's statement is further demonstrated
by the conservative plurality's precise use of language and glaring
refusal to address his statement. First, rather than address Kennedy's
opinion, the plurality spoke to Justice Breyer's dissent, writing:
"all racial classifications [imposed by government] ... must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." ... Justice
Breyer nonetheless relies on the good intentions and motives of
the school districts, stating that he has found "no case that ...
repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which
seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of
minority races." We have found many. Our cases clearly reject
the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis.236
Yet, Kennedy's indication that he would not apply strict scrutiny
in some instances is far more revelatory than Breyer's opinion.
Kennedy is the fifth vote holding together the plurality's future
holdings, while Breyer is merely reiterating a principle that continues
to command only a minority on the Court.
Second, the plurality is careful to use the precise language of
"racial classifications" and to avoid using the term "race-conscious
remedy" throughout its opinion, thereby further disengaging from
Kennedy's point regarding the permissibility of certain race-conscious
remedies.237 In regard to when the use of race is inappropriate,
Kennedy's opinion reaches common ground with the plurality only so
long as one reads the plurality's references to racial classifications as
equivalent to Kennedy's references to individual racial classifications.
His opinion, however, diverges from the plurality if the question is
one regarding race-conscious measures, either individual or general.
Kennedy's opinion distinguishes between using "individual racial
classifications" as a remedial measure and general "race-conscious
measures." '238 The plurality ignores the latter so as to appear facially
consistent with the former. Regardless, Kennedy iterated yet another
profound and unexpected principle regarding race-conscious
remedies that was unnecessary to reach his holding. Moreover, that
he was boisterous throughout, and surprisingly unwilling to go as far
Id. at 563 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)). In Adarand, however,
the Court overruled this application of intermediate scrutiny. 515 U.S. at 227.
236. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2764 (first, second, and fourth
alterations in the original) (citations omitted).
237. See, e.g., id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2747, 2751-55, 2758-60 (using the phrase "racial
classification").
238. See, e.g., id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that race-conscious measures that do not rely on
differential treatment based on individual classifications pose fewer problems).
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in creating roadblocks to racial integration as other members of the
Court seemed ready to go, gives me hope.239
B. An Educational Right Beyond and Bigger Than Brown
Last, hope arises in other unlikely places: state courts and
constitutions. Since the Civil War, victims of inequality and injustice
have sought refuge in the federal courts.2' They found few if any
protections under state law and feared unwelcoming juries and judges
in state courts, even when those state courts were applying federal
law. 241 Now, however, these courts are recognizing that children have
a state constitutional right to a quality education242-which the federal
239. Without question, Kennedy himself creates roadblocks. He struck down the
particular plans in Seattle and Louisville and indicated that henceforth districts could only
use race to make individual decisions if they followed procedures analogous to those in
Grutter. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93. Moreover, the general uses of race in drawing
attendance zones, for instance, will not prove effective in desegregating these schools. Id.
at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2827-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, in keeping with this
piece's focus on hope, I need not go into this critique of Kennedy's opinion, but rather
merely acknowledge and point to it.
240. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-49 (1967) (detailing the history and purpose
of civil rights litigation in federal courts), rev'd sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969).
241. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction To Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 800-05 (1965) (arguing that civil rights claims, even in
criminal cases, must be removed to the federal courts because the litigants were subject to
extreme bias in the state courts); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA.
L. REv. 499, 511 (1995) ("General federal question jurisdiction was created in 1875
because of fears about state court hostility to federal claims.").
242. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) (finding education to
be a fundamental right under the state constitution); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951
(Cal. 1976) (holding that education is a fundamental interest), modified, 569 P.2d 1303
(Cal. 1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (holding that education is a
fundamental right); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 679 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Il. App. Ct. 1997) (finding
the Illinois constitution provides for at least a minimally adequate education); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (finding the right to an
adequate education is fundamental); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that education is a fundamental right); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703
A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (holding that a constitutionally adequate public education is a
fundamental right); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (1997)
(finding the right to an education is guaranteed by the state constitution); Bismarck Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994) (finding education a
fundamental right); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn. 1993)
(finding the state constitution guarantees the right to free public education); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (holding that education is a fundamental
right); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (finding a
right to be provided an education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979)
(holding education is a fundamental constitutional right); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141,
155 (Wis. 1976) (establishing that "the right to equal opportunity for education is a
fundamental right"); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333
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courts and U.S. Constitution have denied them.243 Prior to Brown,
and even in the years that followed Brown, the courts and our
national culture did not fully accept a duty to deliver a substantive
education to our children, nor did they conceptualize education as a
public good that one could demand.2" In fact, placing substance
aside, states did not even enforce the basic requirement that children
of all ages attend school on a regular basis until well into the
twentieth century. 45
Operating within this tradition, the Court wrote in Brown that
"the opportunity of an education ... where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms., 246  This statement was not mere historical semantics, but
rather a carefully crafted recognition that the state need not offer
children an education if it did not wish to. Thus, it was only upon
gratuitously offering an education that equal protection was
implicated. In fact, some members of the Warren Court had
considered reaching a decision in favor of desegregating schools, not
on equal protection grounds, but by recognizing a fundamental
interest in education. Their brethren, however, urged them to
refrain.247  The Justices apparently concluded that such a holding
(Wyo. 1980) (finding education is a matter of fundamental interest); see also Randal S.
Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAW &
INEQ. 239, 270 (1999) (finding that fifteen states had found that education was a
fundamental right under their state constitution); Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a
More "Political Question" Than "Equality?": The Effect of Standards-Based Education on
Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 409 (2000)
(stating every state constitution has an education clause allowing for the argument that
education is a fundamental right).
243. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973)
(holding that no fundamental right to education exists in the Fourteenth Amendment and
that the unequal opportunities to obtain education resulting from wealth inequalities
between school districts does not violate equal protection).
244. See EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 1-3 (Mark G. Yudof et al. eds., 4th ed.
2002) (discussing the evolution of Americans' attitudes toward public schooling).
245. See id. at 13 ("[C]ompulsory education, although legally required, did not
immediately become social fact.").
246. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
247. Hans J. Hacker, The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden Yet Powerful Legal Axiom
at Work in Brown Versus Board of Education, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 5,
46-47 (2006) (discussing the negotiations regarding varying opinion drafts in Brown and
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34-50
(1979) (same); see also WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION 56-59 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (detailing consideration of education as a
fundamental right in Brown and Boiling).
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would push the law and culture too far.2' Although the Court
avoided the issue in Brown, it resurfaced two decades later in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.249 In Rodriguez,
the Court squarely held that education was not a fundamental right
and that inequalities in education based on wealth do not violate
equal protection. 50  With that decision, the Court effectively
eliminated any education equalization litigation in the federal
courts251 and implicitly sanctioned gross inequalities in education.
Yet, on the same exact questions of law, those advocates who
met their darkest hours in federal court eventually found their
brightest hours in state courts. When the progress of Brown began to
slow in the federal courts in the 1970s,252 remedies for educational
inequities began to abound in state courts.253 Most notably, Derrick
Bell worked on desegregation cases in the 1960s, but during the 1970s
began work on Serrano v. Priest, 4 one of the earliest state finance
equity cases and a forerunner of later litigation directed at
substantively improving school quality and adequacy.255  Using
248. See Hutchinson, supra note 247, at 47-50 (speculating as to which Justices
discouraged Chief Justice Warren from basing the opinion in Brown and Boiling on a
fundamental rights analysis); G. Edward White, Earl Warren as Jurist, 67 VA. L. REV. 461,
474 (1981) (noting general uncertainty as to why Chief Justice Warren excised a discussion
of education as a fundamental right from his draft of Boiling, and suggesting it was to
placate Justices Black and Frankfurter).
249. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
250. Id. at 18.
251. See Gregory C. Malhoit & Derek W. Black, The Power of Small Schools:
Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity Through Academic Success and Democratic
Citizenship, 82 NEB. L. REV. 50, 59-60 (2003) (noting that Rodriguez "closed the door" to
litigation focused on obtaining equal resources for each child in different school districts).
252. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-38 (1976)
(overturning a district court desegregation order); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-
43 (1974) (refusing to extend remedies to entire metropolitan areas because of school
district lines), affd, 433 U.S. 269 (1977); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973)
(distinguishing between de facto and de jure segregation).
253. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976) (holding the state's
school financing scheme violated the state's equal protection clause); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977) (concluding education was a fundamental right under
the state constitution and that the state's school financing scheme violated that right);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297-98 (N.J. 1973) (finding that the state's financing
system did not meet the constitutional requirement that the education system be thorough
and efficient).
254. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (section 31 was
added by Proposition 209 in 1996).
255. See Christopher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present,
and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 387
(2005) (noting Bell's work on Serrano); see also EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW,
supra note 244, at 780-81, 797-804 (discussing the immediate reaction to and continuing
legacy of Serrano).
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substantive measures of educational quality, advocates in these cases
have fought to ensure that all children receive an education that
prepares them for high school graduation, college, and
employment. 6  These cases often focus on socioeconomic status
rather than race, but their connection to Brown is inherent.2 7 They
aim to offer disadvantaged children a quality education that is equal
to that of more wealthy suburban children-an education that offers
them that basic chance "to succeed in life" described in Brown. 
2 8
The connection between Brown and state education litigation is
best exemplified by Clarendon County, South Carolina. The 1954
Brown decision was actually a consolidated case that included
plaintiffs from school districts in counties of four different states, one
of which was Clarendon County.259 This community, however, like so
many others, never achieved the full promise of Brown 6.2 ° The all-
black school system abandoned the pursuit of integration as irrelevant
long ago, but, continually hobbled by fiscal neglect, insufficiency, and
inequality, it eventually turned to the state constitution in recent
years seeking educational adequacy. 61 In Abbeville County School
District v. State,262 the South Carolina Supreme Court responded by
holding that the state constitution mandates that in every school
district in the state, "each child ... receive a minimally adequate
education, '263 and on remand, the trial court found that the state had
failed to deliver such an education to poor children.26
256. See generally Malhoit & Black, supra note 251, at 62-67 (discussing the effects of
published reports containing statistics that American children are receiving a poor
education on many measures).
257. See Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to
the Present, reprinted in EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, supra note 244, at 767,
770 ("Although the Supreme Court did not tie its findings in the Brown case to financing
of schools, the subsequent remedies to the findings involved additional financial resources,
which quickly affected school finance.").
258. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
259. See id. at 486 n.1 (noting that Brown consolidated Briggs v. Elliot from Clarendon
County, South Carolina).
260. See Ellis Cose, A Dream Deferred, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, at 52 (discussing
the inequalities that persist in schools today).
261. See Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (holding
that the South Carolina Constitution requires that "each child ... receive a minimally
adequate education").
262. 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
263. Id. at 540.
264. Molly A. Hunter, Nat'l Access Network, South Carolina Court Orders Preschool
Through Third-Grade Interventions to Counter Poverty, Declares State Education




Cases such as Abbeville accord, in part, with Calmore's advocacy
for justice in place, meaning that African Americans should not have
to relocate or abandon their communities to obtain a remedy to
inequality, but rather inequality should also be remedied by
rebuilding and strengthening racially isolated minority communities
in the places they currently exist.265 Educational equity and adequacy
cases, likewise, implicitly reject the notion that integration is the
"only game in town 26 6 that can provide students with a quality
educational opportunity and, instead, are premised on repairing the
existing educational system in poor and minority neighborhoods.267
This state litigation finally seeks to deliver a quality education to
black children in black schools in black communities, which is what
some communities disgruntled with desegregation and skeptical of
the insinuation that blacks need to sit next to whites to learn have
demanded since the 1970s26  Thus, the cases reflect Calmore's
sentiment that "black America [must] seek spatial equality even in
the absence of integration" because integration is too easily
abandoned and racially isolated communities are left to wane without
options.2 69  "Too often integration, as an imperative, has simply
displaced an orientation toward spatial equality. 2 7°
Moreover, cases based on educational adequacy or quality have
been met with success in the highest courts of the states. A wave of
265. See generally Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 159 (discussing the importance
of spatial equality and its effects on true integration). Likewise, Calmore builds part of his
social justice lawyering course around this concept, requiring students' major writing
assignment, the social justice complaint, to make a claim for justice in place or spatial
reparations. See Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 5, at 1201 n.120 (describing the
assignment).
266. Calmore, Racialized Space, supra note 25, at 1246 (noting and criticizing Massey
and Denton's positing of integration as "the only game in town" (citing MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 5, at 216)).
267. See, e.g., Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) (holding that
the current state statute "must be amended, or new legislation passed, so as to assure that
poorer urban districts' educational funding is substantially equal to that of property-rich
districts"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328-29 (N.Y. 2003)
(asking the state to improve the quality of education for children in the predominantly
minority public schools); Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 538 (asking the state to increase funding
to "less wealthy" schools to provide an adequate education).
268. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-93, 505-15
(1975) (discussing the conflict between civil rights attorneys who seek to pursue the
strategy of school integration with the community interest in obtaining an improved
education, particularly in all-black school districts).
269. Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 159, at 1492; see also Calmore, Racialized
Space, supra note 25, at 1246 (critiquing the rejection of policies to "build and strengthen
indigenous social and political institutions from within the ghetto").
270. Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 159, at 1492.
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litigation has swept the nation over the last two decades,
demonstrating the deprivations, inadequacies, and simply low quality
of education that many poor, minority, and rural children receive.171
State courts, for instance, have regularly responded by holding that
their state constitutions guarantee every child in the state a "sound
basic education," requiring substantive components which include:
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English
language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental
mathematics and physical science to enable the student to
function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2)
sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and
basic economic and political systems to enable the student to
make informed choices with regard to issues that affect the
student personally or affect the student's community, state, and
nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable
the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education
or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and
vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal
basis with others in further formal education or gainful
employment in contemporary society.
272
The most ironic case may be from Connecticut, where the state's
supreme court recognized a qualitative right to education, but also
found that "the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the
public school system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal
educational opportunity and requires the state to take further
remedial measures. '273  This duty exists regardless of whether the
271. See Malhoit & Black, supra note 251, at 58-67 (recounting the waves of state
education litigation). James Ryan, however, has found that suits brought on behalf of
minority schools may be less successful than those brought on behalf of rural white
schools, presumably because of the continuing influence of race in our country. See
generally James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 432 (1999).
272. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (citation omitted).
Several other courts have adopted the exact same or very similar requirements. See, e.g.,
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989) (setting forth a
list of nine required characteristics of an "efficient" school); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
801 N.E.2d at 332 (reinstating the trial court's holding that students were entitled to a
sound basic education); Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 540 (requiring three components for a
school to provide an "adequate" education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va.
1979) (listing eight elements of an "efficient" school system).
273. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996). Plaintiffs returned to the
courts in 2005 in a strictly adequacy-based suit in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in
Education Funding, Inc. ("CCJEF") v. Rell. See CCJEF v. Rell, No. HHD-CV-05-
4019406-S (Conn. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 24, 2007); see also Thomas Kaplan, Group Lobbies
for CT Schools, YALE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.yaledailynews.com/ articles/view/20067.
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segregation or isolation is de facto or de jure.274  Thus, the state
constitution dramatically expanded desegregation rights beyond those
found in the federal courts.
Finally, some states have even enacted proactive legislation. For
instance, after being sued and successfully defending an adequacy
case,275 the State of Florida amended its constitution to strengthen the
right to an education.276 The constitution previously required the
state to deliver an "adequate" education, but now requires the state
to provide students with a "high quality system of free public schools
that allows students to obtain a high quality education. 277
However, because the educational clauses and decisions are so
sweeping, extend substantive rights, and place heavy financial
burdens on states, obtaining a quick and full remedy has been the
most difficult aspect of the litigation.278 Some plaintiffs fight with
their legislatures for years for the additional resources necessary to
remedy the demonstrated deficiencies, and many still fall short of a
full remedy.279  With that said, this litigation has nonetheless
274. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1280-82. Justice Breyer, however, points out that the Court's
recent decision in Seattle threatens to overturn decisions and actions such as those in
Connecticut. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.-,
_ 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2833 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
275. Coal. for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400,
408 (Fla. 1996).
276. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
277. Id.
278. Malhoit & Black, supra note 251, at 67-72 (discussing the varying approaches
courts have taken in implementing remedies). In fact, some state legislatures have proved
so recalcitrant that the courts effectively gave up on the cases and, after indicating a
remedy was required, adjudged the cases nonjusticiable based on separation of powers.
See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002) ("[W]e now recognize that any
specific remedy that the judiciary could impose would, in order to be effective, necessarily
involve a usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature."); State ex rel.
State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) (eliminating jurisdiction in every court in
the state to hear further school funding claims because the court believed separation of
powers required it).
279. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U.
L. REV. 550, 552 (1992) (stating that in spite of educational reform, the "crisis has
persisted with an unnerving intractability" (footnote omitted)); Michael Paris, Legal
Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from School Finance Litigation in
Kentucky, 1984-1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 670-71 (2001) (questioning the
effectiveness of the remedies and identifying only moderate gains in educational
outcomes); Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight in Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent
Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform in West
Virginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 62 (2002) (noting that West Virginia has yet
to succeed in its reform efforts); Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of School Finance
and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 527, 532, 537-40
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completely changed the way school districts are funded.28° In
response to these cases, States have added hundreds of millions of
dollars to their educational budgets,281 increased teacher salaries,282
built new schools,8 3 and added meaningful educational programs such
as preschool education for at-risk students.2" In Arkansas, for
instance, the State "committed $846 million for facilities ... and
increased operating aid by over $400 million ... in the 2003-05
biennium" alone.285 Likewise, in response to adequacy litigation, New
(2001) (stating courts are often reluctant to impose stiff remedies in these cases, using New
York, Ohio, and Tennessee as examples).
280. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, supra note 244, at 800-03
(describing the changes to Texas's school financing scheme that occurred during the
course of and in response to four decisions in the Supreme Court of Texas). In fact,
Texas's financing scheme has since returned to the Supreme Court of Texas. See Neeley v.
W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tex. 2005) ("Once again
this court is called upon to determine whether the funding of Texas public schools violates
the Texas Constitution." (footnote omitted)); W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis,
107 S.W.3d 558, 562-63 (Tex. 2003) ("This is the fifth in a series of cases to come before us
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas public school finance system.").
281. See, e.g., CINDY HEINE, KENTUCKY SCHOOL UPDATES: A PARENT/CITIZEN
GUIDE FOR 2002-04, at 76 (2002), available at http://www.prichardcommittee.org/pubs/
updates.pdf (tracking an increase in "overall state funding for education ... from $1.6
billion in 1989-90 prior to the court ruling to $2.1 billion in 1991-92 and $2.9 billion in
2001-02"); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights
Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 919, 921 (1998)
(identifying a $246 million increase to the New Jersey education budget one year and a
later decision that would require another $312 million); Matthew Samberg, Nat'l Access
Network, Litigation Update: Constitution Satisfied in Arkansas, Mixed Ruling in Alaska,
Suit Dropped in Kentucky, New Hampshire Meets Court Deadline (July 3, 2007),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/7-3-071itupdate.php3 (noting a $400 million
increase in Arkansas's school budget); see also Todd Silberman, Schools' Spending Gap
Grows, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 22, 2005, at B1 (reporting on North
Carolina's creation of a $25 million fund to supplement the educational budgets of "low
wealth" school districts).
282. See, e.g., Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Tenn. 2002)
(indicating that in response to its previous decision, the legislature enacted a "plan [that]
provided for state and local funds 'in support of teachers' salary equity' to increase teacher
compensation in school districts averaging less than $28,094 per year per instructional
position."); HEINE, supra note 281, at 76 (calculating an increase in teacher salaries in
Kentucky and a rise in national ranking).
283. See Pendleton Citizens for Cmty. Sch. v. Marockie, 507 S.E.2d 673, 676 n.2 (W.Va.
1998) (noting that the state's new facility construction fund was created in response to
previous school finance litigation); Tractenberg, supra note 281, at 921 (finding that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision would require anywhere from $1.8 billion to $2.8
billion in new funds for school facilities in the state).
284. Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 464 (N.J. 1998); see also Hoke County
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 642, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (2004) (reviewing the trial
court's order of preschool education, but finding that such an order would only be
appropriate after the state had itself first failed to "live up to its constitutional duties").
285. Access Quality Education: Arkansas Litigation, http://www.schoolfunding.info/
states/ar/lit_ar.php3 (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
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Jersey became a leader in offering preschool education to at-risk
students and in 2002, for instance, the governor boosted funding for
preschool education by $150 million.' Such progress simply cannot
be ignored or understated.
These efforts, decisions, and remedies likewise exemplify a
cultural shift in the way society understands its obligation to its
children. 87 These educational improvements are not simply the work
of leftist advocates, liberal judges, or Democratic politicians.
Conservative attorneys, attorneys at both small and major law firms,
and ad hoc coalitions, who simply formed themselves out of
conscience, have also brought these cases. 8  Judges from the
conservative side of the ideological spectrum have issued rulings
favorable to plaintiffs.289  And Republican governors have settled
these cases and agreed to provide huge influxes of resources.29 ° Such
286. Education Law Center, History of Abbott: Progress Toward Equal Educational
Opportunity for Urban Students in New Jersey, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/
AbbottvBurke/AbbottHistory.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). After Arkansas had gone
through funding litigation, the National Access Network concluded: "Arkansas has also
become a leader in providing preschool opportunities to its 'at-risk' children." Access
Quality Education: Arkansas Litigation, supra note 285.
287. See Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1098-100.
288. The plaintiffs in Tennessee's educational finance case were represented by Lewis
R. Donelson, a partner at one of the state's largest firms, Heiskell, Donelson, Bearman,
Adams, Williams & Kirsch. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn.
2002) (listing Donelson as counsel). An example of one such coalition is The Consortium
for Adequate School Funding in Georgia. Approximately fifty school systems have joined
the coalition. It is in current litigation against the State. See Consortium for Adequate
School Funding in Georgia: About CASFG, http://www.casfg.org/about (last visited Feb.
10, 2008). Likewise, in New Hampshire,
it was not a group of radicals, but patriarchs of the state's legal establishment who
joined Tobin and lawyers Arpiar Saunders and John Garvey in asking the high
court to find that the state was shirking its duty to educate its children while
imposing "confiscatory" property tax rates on some citizens and not on others.
Ralph Jimenez, Property Tax Key in School District Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 1993,
at NH7.
289. It was a Republican trial court judge who ordered the State of North Carolina to
devise plans to remedy inadequate educational opportunities in certain school districts and
who finally ordered the state to provide pre-kindergarten instruction for at-risk students.
Jack Betts, Lawmakers Not Dancing, So Governor Is Cutting In: Easley Steps Up with
Funds To Meet Judge Manning's Education Mandate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 10,
2004, at 1P, available at 2004 WLNR 3282456. The Supreme Court of North Carolina,
however, later held that it was in the state's prerogative to first decide whether pre-
kindergarten or some other program was the most effective remedy. Hoke County, 358
N.C. at 642-45, 599 S.E.2d at 393-95.
290. See, e.g., Arkansas Approves New Aid for Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 19, 2006, at
24 (indicating Governor Mike Huckabee had approved an additional $132.5 million in
funding to schools in an attempt to resolve the lawsuit against the State); Linda Jacobson,
California Bill Proposes $2.9 Billion in Aid for 600 Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 6, 2006, at
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widespread support indicates we have moved from a society that in
1954 may or may not have "undertaken to provide" education to one
that believes it is society's responsibility not only to provide it, but to
make it meaningful.291 Notwithstanding the shortcomings one could
point out, that gives me hope.
I will not further elaborate, but our cause for hope does not end
here. We need not look far to find hope when a conservative
Supreme Court overturns its precedent that homosexuals do not have
the right to engage in private consensual behavior,2" defies the same
President that it placed in power 293 by holding that he could not do
with other humans-terrorist or not-as he pleased,294  and
surprisingly reaffirms the power of the federal government and courts
to regulate and punish the pollution of the environment,295 sexual
harassment,296 and retaliation against employees who would oppose
32 (discussing the governor's settlement of a school finance case for $2.9 billion in
additional funding and the legislative bill implementing it).
291. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (regardless of the
importance of education, only requiring a remedy insofar as the state voluntarily chose to
provide an education), with Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 327,
331-32 (N.Y. 2003) (beginning "with a unanimous recognition of the importance of
education to our democracy" and finding that delivering the skills necessary to vote, work,
serve on juries, and be successful throughout high school is the constitutional
responsibility of the state). See generally Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy,
Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL:
CONFERENCE SUMMARY 239 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002) (finding "there is
widespread agreement that an adequate system of education is one that 'ensures that a
child is equipped to participate in political affairs' " (quoting Deborah A. Verstegen &
Terry Whitney, From Courthouses to Schoolhouses: Emerging Judicial Theories of
Adequacy and Equity, 11 EDUC. POL'Y 330, 331 (1997))).
292. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)). The Court in Bowers responded to Hardwick's claim that the State
could not criminalize the private consensual homosexual conduct by stating, "[it is
obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct
have ancient roots." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. Reversing that holding, the Court wrote in
Lawrence that "[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court issued a landmark decision holding that homosexuals had the same right as
heterosexuals to be married in the state. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003).
293. Some argue that Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), was a blatant political act by a
majority of the Supreme Court to preserve a victory for the candidate that they personally
wanted to see as President. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding
the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1045-66 (2001).
294. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. -., 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
295. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
296. See Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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discrimination.297 Thus, we, like our students, must not despair, but
must unearth hope to make it visible.
C. Living a Life of Hope, Growth, and Constancy
This Article will now return squarely to where it began-with
John Calmore-and find hope not only in the law but in him as a
person. His career as a practitioner, teacher, and scholar exemplifies
an interesting evolution that should inspire us. His body of
scholarship is not merely a reflection of his ideas, but also a reflection
of him personally. Unlike some, he eschewed the tendency to
become more inflexible in his position or more pessimistic with age.298
Instead, he evolved, while staying true to his core self. In a recent
article, John Calmore referred to himself as a "marginal man,"
meaning one defined by "'the break-up and mixing of cultures
attendant upon migration and the great cultural revolutions' "299 and
one whom " 'fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two,
not merely different but antagonistic cultures.' "" Yet, I cannot see
him as anything less than someone who has transcended our
polarized, racialized, and marginalized society to eventually become
an "everyman,"3°1 focused on justice, inclusion, and comity for and
with all. In his work, I see someone who used his ever-increasing
faith in humanity to cultivate themes that incorporate people, not
divide or assimilate them. Thus, he attempted to build an identity
and place for everyone.
Calmore's earlier and most prominent piece on critical race
theory starts and ends from the smallest point of departure, fighting
297. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). For a discussion of
how the Court's decision in Jackson potentially expands plaintiffs' private causes of action
in discrimination cases, see generally Derek W. Black, Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of
Action, supra note 150.
298. One oft-cited quote, the source of which is unverified, asserts: "If you're not
liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not conservative by the time you're
35, you have no brain." See The Churchill Centre, Quotes Falsely Attributed to Him,
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=112 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008) (indicating the false attribution to Winston Churchill).
299. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 112-13 (quoting Everett C.
Hughes, Social Change and Status Protest. An Essay on the Marginal Man, in RACE,
CLASS, AND POWER 290, 290 (Raymond W. Mack ed., 1963)).
300. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 113 (quoting Robert Park,
Introduction to EVERETT V. STONEQUIST, THE MARGINAL MAN: A STUDY IN
PERSONALITY AND CULTURE CONFLICT, at vii, xv (1961)).
301. The term derives from a sixteenth-century English morality play. See generally
EVERYMAN AND MEDIEVAL MIRACLE PLAYS (A.C. Cawley ed., 1999). The term in
common usage now means "an ordinary person representative of humanity." WEBSTER'S
II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 389 (3d ed. 2005).
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only for the respect to stand in opposition to and independent of
dominant cultural norms, and to do so as an African American
scholar speaking from an African American perspective.3" He
asserted a race-conscious perspective that was authentic,
representative, and critical." 3 No end beyond that was necessarily
contemplated. He identified the "nation's pressing challenge, ' '3°4 but
posited no collaborative, interracial, or mainstream project that could
meet it. As alluded to earlier, he only supposed that hope might lie in
the birth of new generations less entangled with our biases.3 5 In
some of his other early pieces, he likewise explicated disappointments
that reaffirmed his prognostication.3 6 If anything, his understanding
of injustice actually grew in scope, and the reality of its scope loomed
larger over the prospect for progress. For instance, his writing
identified racial oppression as intersecting with place and poverty,
leaving many inner-city minorities not only exploited, but also
"optionless. 3 °7 Thus, tackling discrimination alone could not resolve
the problem.
However, a change in place in the second half of the 1990s also
seemingly coincided with a further broadening of his scholarship.
Calmore came to the University of North Carolina School of Law in
the fall of 1997. He continued to address issues of race and inner-city
poverty, but within a few years his scholarship began to focus on the
wider category of social justice, which was becoming explicitly
memorialized in his textbook and class in social justice lawyering. °8
In some respects, this was also a response to a change in his reality, as
he had come from Los Angeles, a region that is more multicultural
and spatially closer to the issues of inner-city poverty, to the college
town of Chapel Hill, which, although liberal in thought, is not as
302. See Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19, at 2137 (arguing that critical
race theory "voic[es] ... dissent from many of the law's underlying assumptions" and is
grounded "in a sense of reality that reflects our distinctive experiences as people of
color").
303. Id.
304. Id. at 2229.
305. Id.; see also supra note 22 (discussing "cohort replacement").
306. See, e.g., Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 159, at 1490 (noting that until
society reckons with racism, "denial and neglect will continue to stand in the way of
establishing a coherent urban policy that addresses not only matters of housing and
community development, but also the larger issues of social, economic, and racial justice.
For now, the nation continues to run scared and time continues to run out.").
307. Calmore, Call to Context, supra note 5, at 1938; see also Calmore, Spatial Equality,
supra note 159, at 1492 (noting that in many cities, social stratification along race lines has
been "spacialized").
308. See generally MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6 (providing a
curriculum and mode of approaching the law for those who will practice social justice law).
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multicultural. In short, he came to a place where he was teaching
predominantly white students, many of whom had grown up in rural
settings,3" which I suspect challenged him to begin building new
bridges and methods himself.
Regardless of the cause, a larger John Calmore emerged in the
second half of his career, still race-conscious, but more humanist than
ever before. His work responded to the new community and students
that surrounded him. In a piece that was published during his move
from Loyola to Chapel Hill, his interest in "strong democratic talk"
clearly foreshadowed this evolution.31°  He writes that strong
democratic talk is "conversation that helps us to discover common
bonds" and "allows the parties to explore mutuality and reformulate
views..... Employing this as pedagogy, he impresses on his students
that "we all must learn much more about ourselves and everyone else.
[We must a]void collective self-centeredness ('racialism' some might
say)." '312 Relying on "what brings people together, not what divides
us, ' 3 13 he believes we can "stimulate a little rational conversation
among groups who generally look, walk, and talk past each other., 314
Thus, after spending years hewing a space for critical race theory and
African American voices, his work also began hewing a space for all
voices and developing a sense of justice that includes and spans
beyond race. In essence, asserting his African American voice
entailed asserting his human voice.
His humanist and broader perspective became explicit in the
years following his arrival in North Carolina. In 2002, he wrote: "I
have learned from Charles Lawrence and other progressives,
'Transformative politics requires looking beyond winning or losing
the particular legal dispute or political battle and asking how one's
actions serve to reinforce people's awareness of our interdependence
and mutual responsibility as members of the human family.' "315 His
309. Seventy-two percent of the entering class of 2007 at the UNC School of Law was
from the State of North Carolina and came from forty-seven different counties in the
state. UNC School of Law, Student Body Profile, http://www.law.unc.edu/pastudents/
experience/studentprofile.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). The "minority presence" for
that class was thirty percent. Id.
310. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 906.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 907 (quoting CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xxiv (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)).
313. Id. at 926.
314. Id. at 907.
315. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1133-34 (quoting Charles R.
Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 965 (2001)).
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vision of justice and change increasingly became dependent on a
connection to "human dignity, 316 in which we all obviously can
participate. Moreover, the importance of that connection was so
strong for him that he ironically spoke as though it could simply wipe
the slate of injustice clean, or at least create a level playing field in the
fight for justice. He posited that a humane community can put
indifference and fear aside, start over again, and "reimagine, reinvent,
and reestablish America." '317
This humanist approach also produced an evolution in his
thinking as to the role whites will play in racial justice. Again, his
early work is primarily focused on the African American scholar, an
African American oppositional voice, and white racism.31 8 The
concern with those subjects never fades, but his later scholarship
more clearly creates a space for whites to also be part of the
oppositional voice to both general oppression and white racism. He
writes: "Whites may assume responsibility without blame for the
nation's racial predicament and, to the degree injustice is
acknowledged, develop a non-racist sensibility and an anti-racist
orientation."3 9 Then in 2002, he directly calls on whites "to engage in
the serious work of advancing a cultural shift that facilitates their
movement from racial ambivalence to racial comity and a sincere
embrace of our common humanity. 3 2' And rather than sit idly by, he
engages in seeing whites begin this movement and writes that "[t]he
hope for a better day lies in trying to move whites from ambivalence
to comity. '3 21 Similarly, in North Carolina, re-socializing law students
becomes a matter of re-socializing predominantly white law
students.322
Moreover, although asserting opposition to whiteness as
currently constructed, he begins articulating a progressive color
consciousness in which whites participate. In a piece on whiteness, he
316. Id. at 1134.
317. Id. The key to overcoming our biases and discriminatory urges is to view others
"as the human beings that they really are, as members of society who deserve a fair shot at
living their lives as part of the larger humanity within this nation." Id. at 1138.
318. See generally Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19 (arguing for the
legitimization of African American oppositional scholarship through Critical Race
Theory); Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note 159 (showing Calmore's early work and its
focus on finding a place for an African American perspective amidst largely white
paradigms).
319. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 919.
320. Calmore, Warren Court Legacy, supra note 17, at 1103.
321. Id. at 1131.
322. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (summarizing the cultural and racial
make-up of UNC law school classes).
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calls on whites to begin incorporating African Americans into the
national identity and norms rather than requiring African Americans
to assimilate with the white/national identity and norms.23  He
cautions elsewhere, "I firmly believe that the multicultural future
must not alienate, but, rather, incorporate Whites. 3 24 In essence, his
vision for a new national identity is one of multiple, equal, non-
competitive identities. All would, in effect, perform their racialized
identity.3" If whiteness could become enough of a color, it would
allow whites to likewise be included in "a multicultural nation 'as
people of color.' ",326 They too could "be subject to audition, an
audition of humanity that connects us all. 3 27 In the end, Calmore's
motivations seem to be premised on the notion that a rising tide will
lift all boats.328
The above, however, is not to suggest that Calmore changed.
Instead, he evolved while remaining true to his earlier self.
Throughout, his writing was never conciliatory, flinching, or oblivious
to any injustice; it remained consistently oppositional. It only
broadened its scope in terms of who might be part of the opposition,
how they might stand in opposition, and what they might oppose.
Likewise, he never changed his core race consciousness, nor did his
focus on broader categories of social justice dilute it. He challenged
the universality of white experience in both his earliest and most
recent pieces.329
In any number of respects, we see him repeating those same
basic, yet insightful, concepts about race. In 1992, he conceives of
whiteness as "a performance" that African Americans are asked to
act out and a cultural construct against which they are measured.330
323. See Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 127-28.
324. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 919.
325. See Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 128.
326. Calmore, Close Encounters, supra note 7, at 920 (quoting a student's reflection
piece regarding a discussion in class).
327. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 128.
328. Although the phrase "a rising tide lifts all boats" may have originated elsewhere,
President John F. Kennedy popularized it in one of his later speeches. President John F.
Kennedy, Remarks in Heber Springs, Arkansas, at the Dedication of Greers Ferry Dam
(Oct. 3, 1963), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9455
(transcript).
329. Compare Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19, at 2160-61 (characterizing
critical race theory as "challenging the universality of white experience/judgment as the
authoritative standard"), with Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 100-04
(arguing that the demands that "whiteness" makes on blacks-namely that blacks
"perform" their race-are not "benign, but" an exercise of "group-based white
supremacy, dominance, and power").
330. See Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19, at 2219.
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Twelve years later, that concept becomes the thesis of a full article.33
Similarly, early on, he critiques racial assimilation as an attempt by
African Americans to run away from themselves and their
communities.332 That notion continues to fuel his scholarship over the
next decade, as he advocates for spatial equality/justice-in-place and
critiques integration and deconcentration of the inner-city poor
(insofar as many assume they are the only option for progress).333
Both the early critique of assimilation and the later call for spatial
equality are premised on the dignity and value of African American
communities and norms, which should not be run from or destroyed,
but rather returned to and rebuilt.
Finally, although this piece has made much of Calmore's later
focus on humanity, his sense of its power to redeem us was always
present, just not as pronounced. Fifteen years ago, he quietly
footnoted Maya Angelou and asked us to remember:
The fact that people became heroes and sheroes can be credited
to their ability to identify and empathize with "the other."
These men and women ... [m]ake the decision to be conscious
of the other-the homeless and the helpless, the downtrodden
and oppressed. Heroism has nothing to do with skin color or
social status.334
This suggests his later work did not reach a newfound faith in
humanity, but simply a bolder one. The more he changed, the more
he stayed the same, and by becoming an advocate for broader claims,
he became a better advocate for those who started and remained
closest to his heart. Thus, in closing, John Calmore gives me hope.
He gives me hope that we can see past the immediacy of our reality,
331. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition, supra note 32, at 102 (noting that "[t]his [current]
essay is an extension of that earlier observation") (referring to Calmore, Critical Race
Theory, supra note 19, at 2160).
332. See Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19, at 2226.
333. See, e.g., MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 839-930 (including
a chapter on redressing spatial inequality and injustice in housing); John 0. Calmore,
Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067,
1073 (1998) (finding that integration policy has failed and we "must look to [black]
communities within as sites and opportunities, resisting their spatial oppression and
overcoming, in place, the disabling, opportunity-denying circumstances that are marked by
the tripartite intersection of race, class, and space"); Calmore, Spatial Equality, supra note
159, at 1488 (cautioning against over-reliance on integration and instead "demand[ing], as
a matter of justice, that the enrichment program finally receive the policy attention and
financial commitment necessary to compensate for decades of neglect and active
exploitation" of black communities).
334. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, supra note 19, at 2229 n.388 (quoting Maya
Angelou, An American Odyssey: From Martin Luther King to Rodney King, 8 NEW
PERSP. Q., Summer 1991, at 36, 37).
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envision a brighter future, and continue the work that will bring that
future to fruition.
CONCLUSION
When I spoke with John Calmore about the focus of this piece,
he responded with approval coupled with what seemed to be a tinge
of surprise. He remarked that he would, in fact, like others to
remember his work for its hope, but seemed to not have foreseen that
I would concentrate on it. When first contemplating the theme, it
struck me as somewhat surprising as well because I remember often
feeling during his classes that he was unsettled by despair, depression,
or disgust over the current state of affairs. That I might instinctively
associate him with hope, therefore, seemed somewhat quizzical. My
own experience in teaching social justice lawyering and realizing that
I also appeared unsettled and depressed to my students only added to
the oddity of my choice of topic. Upon further reflection, however, I
surmised that my negative emotions and outward appearance were
primarily a reflection of my students' depression over and
disappointment in the world and law-which we were labeling as
unjust, intractable at times, and worsening-rather than a reflection
of my inward feelings. I had hope for them and the future. The
problem was that my students appeared to be shaken by what they
learned and losing hope. It was that fact that frustrated and
depressed me; the very people whom I wanted to share my hope did
not. Speaking with Calmore and reviewing his work years later, I
realize that he must have felt the same and that I misinterpreted his
frustration with us as a lack of hope.
Yet my experiences as a student and professor reveal that having
hope within us is not enough; we must share it. Interspersing our
critiques with intermittent caveats about progress is not enough; we
must emphasize its potential. Leaving students to find their own hope
is not enough; we must help them. Many of our defeats and
disappointments are far too indwelled in our spirits and
conversations, particularly among the students who self-select our
classes and already come carrying a good dose of indignation toward
the prevalence of injustice. While we must press our students toward
a more sophisticated understanding of injustice, we must not allow
sophistication to inadvertently overwhelm inspiration. We do that by
helping them retain the emotion that brought them to the class and
law school in the first place: excitement and hope that the law, and
they as lawyers, really can help cure at least a small portion of the
world's ills. The tendency of law school curriculum and culture is to
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deprive them of that. Moreover, the steadily rising cost of law
school,335 the declining amount of scholarships and financial aid,336
and the widening gap between social justice law and law firm (and
government) salaries337 place pressures on students that may be
reinforced, rather than counteracted, by the messages we send
them.338 If we do not inspire them, who or what will? If they are not
inspired, who will be our social engineers? As I believe that John
Calmore, the legacy of Brown, and various other surprising markers
in our courts reveal, we have much with which to inspire students.
We must simply look for it with the same earnest zeal with which we
look for injustice.
335. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT & FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE
BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE 9 (2003) ("Despite
their deep commitment to ensure access to justice for all citizens, many law school
graduates" find that the increasing cost of a legal education "forces them to forego any
form of public service."); Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to
Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 886
(2002).
336. See generally MAHONEY, CALMORE & WILDMAN, supra note 6, at 25-28
(discussing how the cost of law school and debt affect students' career choices); Robert
Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 136-37 (2005) (finding the
average debt of law school graduates is increasing).
337. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revez, Legal Education and Entry into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
829, 833, 865-74 (1995) (listing legal profession salaries by category); Rubinson, supra note
336, at 136 & n.168 (discussing the gap).
338. For most, however, the sum total result of these pressures is not that students are
depressed or discouraged, but that they simply abandon their choice of social justice
lawyering for private practice. Kornhauser & Revez, supra note 337, at 833; Marilyn
Yarbrough, Financing Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 461 (2001) (concluding
that fewer students can afford to take public interest jobs). I fear, however, that many of
those students who are forced into private practice or rationalize that practice, rather than
freely choose it, will experience rude awakenings and a different type of depression. See
Schiltz, supra note 10, at 881-88, 895-903 (revealing how unhappy attorneys are,
particularly those in large firm practice, and how high salaries are not an antidote to that
unhappiness).
